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by Rolf J. Langhammer and Rainer Schweickert
Mexico's recent financial crisis, culminating in December 1994, threatens the positive
effects of the substantial reforms that the country has implemented since 1985 by
openning its real sector: first trade has been liberalized unilaterally, then Mexico has joined
the GATT, the Uruguay Round, the NAFTA and recently the OECD and thus has commit-
ted itself to internationally binding rules and liberalization schedules. Furthermore,
foreign direct investment has been invited to formerly closed sectors. With these
reforms, Mexico has succeeded in establishing a solid base for a sustainable take-off.
However, both the legacies of past distortions and the effects of its exchange-rate-
based stabilization policy have prevented Mexico from fully harvesting the fruits of its
reform efforts. Capital productivity still warrants improvement, investment und domestic
savings ratios are lower than in Asia and in the Latin American "success story" Chile.
In merchandise trade, non-traditional exports and import-competing domestic indu-
stries have suffered from real appreciation.
FDI flows to Mexico rose after adjustment programmes were implemented. However,
absolute increases cannot obscure the fact that Mexico's position in US foreign direct
investment (the major source of FDI inflows) only recovered to levels already achieved
prior to the debt crisis in 1982. German and particularly Japanese investment remained
below this level and even declined in relative terms. Furthermore, there are structural vul-
nerabilities: Mexico's industrial exports and inward foreign investment heavily concen-
trate on the motor vehicle industry, which exposes the country to short-term fluctuations
in consumer demand for cars, particularly in the United States. In total, even before the
December 1994 crisis, Mexico was not as attractive a host to FDI as newly industrializing
countries in Asia or transformation economies in Europe.
Both external factors (increase in US interest rates) and political events (regional upheav-
als, the assassination of the presidential candidate, elections) led to the outbreak of the
financial crisis in December 1994. Yet, the Mexican exchange-rate-based stabilization
strategy can be regarded as the real cause of the crisis. This strategy entailed high risks
and was also implemented in an inconsistent way: the so-called Pacto agreements fail-
ed to provide sufficiently restrictive monetary and wage policies, the fiscal surplus was
achieved by cutting public investment rather than taxing consumption, and factor market
deregulation was delayed.
1995 forecasts of high inflation and negative GDP growth show that Mexico has entered
the "bust" phase of exchange-rate-based stabilization strategies. The only short-run option
is to continue the present float of the Peso and to establish the credibility of the money sup-
ply target. In the medium run, Chile's passive crawl with wide bands provides a blueprint
for a low-risk exchange rate management.
Without re-establishing the credibility of monetary policies, the gains from real sector reforms
will not materialize. Yet, even with credibility, Mexico has to remove several bottlenecks, e.g.,
in human cpital and infrastructure before it can fully reap the gains from previous reforms.
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Since many years, Mexico has been grouped
among the six so-called first generation NICs
(newly industrializing countries), jointly with
Brazil as the only other Latin American country
and the four East Asian economies .of Hong
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (OECD
1988: 11). However, contrary to the East Asian
members of the group, economic growth was
hampered by macroeconomic mismanagement.
The debt crisis of the early eighties marked the
beginning of an unprecedented depression. To
recover from this decline proved to be among the
most painful experiences of structural adjust-
ment in all indebted developing countries. Yet,
Mexico mastered the challenge with a strong
credible package of economic, social and insti-
tutional reforms initiated in the second half of
the eighties. By the early nineties, it then became
a major host of foreign capital again.
This economic progress, which was achieved
during the last decade, is presently jeopardized
by the financial crisis that broke out in Decem-
ber 1994. To overcome the crisis requires that
the short-run turbulences be mastered. This is a
necessary condition for Mexico to return to a
sustainable growth path. At the same time, there
is scope to improve the long-run perspectives.
Given the size of its economy, Mexico — after
Brazil — has always ranked second among the
six first-generation NICs in terms of share in
world GDP and world manufacturing value
added but, like Brazil, failed to defend the same
ranking as concerns world trade. Asian NICs
easily bypassed Mexico from the early seventies
onwards as dynamic exporters of goods and
services. Therefore, policies have to be dis-
cussed that contribute to reduce erratic fluctua-
tions, to improve the international competitive-
ness of Mexican factors of production and to
allow trickling down effects of growth to be-
come effective to the low-income segments of
the electorate. The latter is of considerable im-
portance for achieving social coherence and
peace. Ultimately, Mexican policies will have to
aim at including as many private households and
companies in a developmental growth coalition
as possible. East Asian countries bear witness to
the importance of such broad growth coalitions,
which contribute to mobilize domestic savings
and to allocate financial resources efficiently.
Hence, the long-run perspectives affecting
Mexican trade and investment under interna-
tional locational competition for mobile re-
sources will be given priority in this study.
Chapter II discusses the medium-term perspec-
tives in the real sector that were perceived as
achievable before the crisis broke out. Perspec-
tives for trade expansion emerged from three
layers: from domestic structural adjustment,
from commitments toward trade liberalization
within the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) and, finally, from prospects for
Mexico offered by the successful conclusion of
the multilateral trade negotiations. However, the
extent to which these options could be used were
conditioned by productivity increases following
the modernization of the capital stock. Evidence
suggests that it is foreign direct investment that
plays a major role in this respect. Hence, the
second part of Chapter II concentrates on the
attractiveness of Mexico for private risk capital
from abroad relative to competing hosts, for
instance, in Latin America and East Asia. It will
be shown that in the past Mexico suffered from
relatively low productivity of total investment
and that one can expect a rebound in output
growth once obsolete capital is fully replaced by
new more productive equipment.
Chapter III is devoted to the key prerequisite
of realizing options in the real sector: consistent,
stable and credible macroeconomic management
that is instrumental to cut inflation and to stabi-
lize the real exchange rate. For this purpose, it is
necessary first to discuss reasons for the failure
of past exchange rate stabilization in Mexico. In
this respect, it has to be distinguished between
"natural" risks, which are inherent and systemic
in each exchange-rate-based stabilization pro-
gramme, and "policy-induced" risks, which stem
from inconsistent implementation. The second
part of Chapter III discusses two alternative
concepts for returning to exchange rate stabiliza-tion: first, a renewed fixing of the exchange rate
in a currency board framework and second, a
rule-based exchange rate management allowing
exchange rate flexibility, hi assessing the rela-
tive merits of the two approaches, experiences of
other developing countries are taken into ac-
count. Chapter IV concludes with the results.
II. Long-Run Perspectives: The Real Side
1. Trade Perspectives
a. Reform of the Trading Regime
Next to Brazil, Mexico is the largest single
economy in the group of upper-middle income
countries. Measured at current exchange rates in
1992 dollars, it just keeps the median position in
per capita income in this group of twenty coun-
tries, hi purchasing power parity (PPP dollars),
it more than doubles its per capita income and
approaches one-third of the US income. Post-
war experience suggests that countries of this
size have been tempted to pursue inward-looking
trade policies relying on quantitative restrictions
much longer than smaller countries with more
exposure to world markets have, hi addition,
these large economies were often commodity-
rich and hence preferred to exploit "natural"
rents instead of making their human and capital
resources internationally competitive. Even if
their governments understood the "two-edged
sword" role of commodity abundance in eco-
nomic development and tried to minimize exoge-
nous shocks emerging from the commodity sec-
tor, they often had to cope with Dutch-disease
syndromes impeding export diversification ef-
forts. Finally, whenever inward-lookingness be-
came unsustainable, trade reform endeavours
were usually more half-hearted and less consis-
tent than in other much smaller resource-poor
economies.
hi many instances, Mexico's post-war devel-
opment reflects this pattern, though the eaiiy
export diversification through "border indus-
tries" adjacent to the United States may speak
against this hypothesis. However, offshore as-
sembly zones isolated from the policy conditions
prevailing in the rest of the economy operated in
many countries but did not change the inward-
ness of the entire economy. Their main short-
coming was that, due to unchanged import sub-
stitution policies in the rest of the economy, they
neither used inputs from the rest of the country
because these inputs were noncompetitive. Nor
did they compete with the output produced under
import substitution strategies. Hence, the effects
of such zones on the rest of the economy in
terms of productivity increases remained very
limited. Mexico operated such a trading regime
until the mid-eighties.
Trade Policy Reform as a Cornerstone of
Structural Adjustment in Mexico
hi 1985, first major steps in trade policy reform
were taken (Nash 1991: 495-504). Their later
success was much determined by the fact that
from the very beginning exchange rate measures
were part of the reform, hi July 1985, the gov-
ernment announced a 20 per cent devaluation of
the controlled exchange rate, followed by the
start of a managed floating exchange rate and an
acceleration of the nominal depreciation rate.
Still a dual exchange rate system was main-
tained but rates were managed in a way to pre-
pare for currency unification. The trading re-
gime in its narrower sense was shaped almost
simultaneously (July 1985) by rolling back
quantitative restrictions. As a follow-up, GATT
membership was requested in 1986 (see Section
II.l.c), the maximum tariff was reduced from
100 to 50 per cent, quantitative restrictions
(measured as equivalents of domestic produc-
tion) were announced to be redressed in a step-
wise approach, and reference prices on imports
were eliminated to comply with GATT anti-
dumping procedures.
Trade policy reforms not only embarked upon
import liberalization as a means to lower the
implicit tax on exports. To directly foster ex-ports, also export promotion measures (for ex-
ample, rebating duties and indirect taxes, remov-
ing quantitative export controls, consolidating
export financing) were adopted with the support
of World Bank export development loans. Indi-
rect and direct export orientation became not
only accepted as a strategy to earn foreign ex-
change in a period when oil prices dropped. It
was also disseminated nationwide as a way to
contain inflation and to ensure the success of
monetary stabilization. It is important to note
that grave effects on import-substituting indus-
tries were either mitigated by simultaneous de-
preciation or by substituting nontariff measures
for tariff measures, hi some cases, measures are
reported to have been symbolic only, as they
were not binding at the time of reforms. Because
of depreciation (1981-1987), Mexico became
one of the most competitive suppliers among the
developing countries in terms of wage costs but
failed to stabilize the real exchange rate. Growth
of exports in dollar terms could not be sustained
after 1987, when the peso began to appreciate in
real terms. As a result, between 1985 and 1992,
dollar-denominated exports (excluding maquila-
dora industries) rose by 3.5 per cent annually
only, while imports rose by more than 20 per
cent (UN/ECLA 1994: 283).
Even if we exclude the exceptional 1990-
1992 period (when massive capital inflows eased
budget constraints and let import demand in-
crease overproportionately) and concentrate on
1985-1990 only, annual rates of export growth
amounted to 4.4 per cent only compared with
18.8 per cent on the import side. One may ex-
plain this gap with the usually delayed reaction
of export volumes relative to import volumes
when trade is liberalized, but it may also indi-
cate a structural vulnerability of the Mexican
export supply, both regionally and sectorally.
Regionally, the US market absorbs major parts
of the Mexican supply even if we disregard the
maquiladora industries.
1 Therefore, a recession
in this market, as at the turn of the decade, af-
fects the Mexican export industry severely. Risk
spreading by shifting export supply to other
markets has not yet been achieved as much as it
seems necessary. Sectorally, Mexican noncom-
modity export supply is dominated by metal
manufacturing, basically the motor vehicle in-
dustry: in 1992, about one-third of manufactur-
ing exports (one-fifth of total exports) consisted
of exports of the motor-vehicle industry. Again,
together with the regional focus, this compounds
the dependence on US business cycles because
output in this industry is largely determined by
final consumer demand and, as a durable con-
sumer good, by easy access to consumer credits
in the United States. Unlike Asian countries,
which increasingly export capital goods and
intermediates with a larger regional spread and
which seem to have reduced a single market-
single industry dependence, Mexico is strongly
exposed to determinants of US demand for du-
rable consumer goods.
Hence, the necessity for product innovation
(up-grading, diversification) and for the search
for new markets outside the United States is
given. It is important to mention in this context
that product innovation itself depends on raising
the skill content in products. Therefore, human
capital formation and improvement emerges as
one of the most demanding prerequisites of sus-
tainable structural adjustment in Mexico. This
holds the more as real appreciation in recent
years has contributed to making existing pro-
duction techniques obsolete, and new technolo-
gies incorporated in foreign direct investment
(FDI), for instance, will replace them. As con-
cerns policies towards FDI, reforms in 1989 led
to substantial liberalization with respect to sec-
tor coverage, automatic approval and 100 per
cent foreign ownership. About two-thirds of
GDP is estimated to be unrestricted for FDI
(GATT 1993: 62). Remaining categories of
restricted activities include not only the energy
sector, which is reserved for the state, but also
extractive industries and some manufacturing
industries (secondary petrochemicals, auto parts
and related industries) in which nonresidents are
not allowed to hold equity of more than 30 per
cent and 40 per cent respectively. It can be ex-
pected that remaining restrictions are binding in
the sense that relaxing them would attract more
foreign investment to Mexico.
To increase productivity in the new capital
stock and to make full use of FDI for the Mexi-
can economy, new technologies must be com-plemented by joint quality improvements on the
labour side, i.e., employing more skilled and
flexible workers. This includes not only school-
ing improvements but also, again demonstrated
by the Asian example, improvements in learning
on the job. Structural adjustment, thus, should
be targeted at high employment levels in order to
enable large parts of the labour force to improve
their skills on the job.
Challenges to Mexico's Trading Regime
Mexico has substantially streamlined and lib-
eralized its trading regime since 1985. Despite
this achievement, Mexico will cope with a num-
ber of challenges unilaterally, regionally and
multilaterally in the future. First, unilaterally, in
its own interest, Mexico will have to give distri-
butional targets greater attention (for regional
and multilateral challenges see Section Il.l.b
and c). This is not to say that equity and effi-
ciency are trade-offs, hi many developing coun-
tries, distributional aspects of policy reforms
have proven to be essential for overall accep-
tance in the electorate and for active participa-
tion in middle-class growth coalitions. Such
aspects can be considered by institutionalized
negotiations (pacto agreements; for these agree-
ments see Section HI.l) to ensure concerted ac-
tions of interest groups. Latin America in gen-
eral and Mexico in particular share a large expe-
rience with this approach. Alternatively, deliber-
ate policy measures can be taken (or given up)
to allow hitherto discriminated groups to partici-
pate in the market process and to mobilize idle
resources. Policy measures to protect agro-based
industries from international competition, for
instance, in the sugar industry, bear large
medium-term opportunity costs because of ne-
glecting the agricultural sector as a source of
income generation and foreign exchange earn-
ings. An important element of more equity in
Mexico's income distribution will therefore be to
link the potential of the rural sector (including
rural-based industries) to the rest of the econ-
omy. Agricultural liberalization after concluding
the Uruguay round will help to provide precon-
ditions for the expansion of agricultural ex-
ports.
2
Second, another challenge is to master inter-
national tendencies toward stricter technical and
environmental standards, including stricter mini-
mum norms concerning intellectual property
rights. Mexico has become a target of extraterri-
torially enforced norms in the tuna dispute with
the United States and found its view supported
that unilateral measures violate the GATT.
However, multilaterally negotiated standards
meet the rules of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and bear costs for Mexico in terms of
technological up-grading of plants and pro-
cesses. Burden sharing with foreign investors
would be the best strategy for Mexico but is
conditioned by Mexico's continuing attractive-
ness as a host for foreign risk capital (see Sec-
tion II.2).
Third, Mexico faces a challenge of success. It
has become a rapidly growing exporter of non-
factor services. Among such services, consumer
services (in particular travel expenditures of
nonresidents) have accounted for a rising share
in total exports of goods and services. In 1985,
foreign exchange income from travel expendi-
tures accounted for 10.6 per cent of Mexican
total exports, while seven years later this share
rose to 14.5 per cent (UN/ECLA 1994: 283). hi
other nonfactor services, mainly business serv-
ices, Mexico has shown a similarly good per-
formance: the share of miscellaneous nonfactor
services (except travel and transport) in total
Mexican exports doubled from 8 to 16 per cent
during the same period, hi fact, Mexico has to
defend a position as the leading Latin American
exporter of commercial services, far ahead of
Brazil and at the same level as Taiwan and Ko-
rea (GATT 1994a: Table 9). To defend this
position, further policy actions toward the lib-
eralization of market access for nonresidents to
the Mexican service sector are required, hi addi-
tion, rapid technological change in service indus-
tries, especially in telecommunication, has im-
plications for capital formation, both human and
physical. Again, the financial burden should
preferably be shared between residents and non-
residents by attracting foreign risk capital.b. Regional Integration: The NAFTA
Framework
Mexican Gains from NAFTA
Unlike many other integration schemes in which
developing countries participated over the last
thirty years, NAFTA is far from being a redun-
dant grouping. Instead, next to the EC-1992
single market programme, it can be labelled as
the most effective endeavour to regional integra-
tion so far. For Mexico, NAFTA was the logical
institutional complement and follow-up of its
very intensive economic relations with the
United States in trade and factor flows, hi fact,
the US share of 70 per cent in Mexican trade
suggests the United States to be the natural
trading partner for Mexico due to mutual com-
plementarity in resource endowment, geographi-
cal proximity and large absorptive capacity of
the US market. Prior to NAFTA, the growth of
maquiladora industries, based on US offshore
assembly provisions, had already provided a
good momentum for exploiting such complemen-
tarity but this sort of liberalization was one-
sided and not mutual, and it was regionally and
sectorally limited. A full-fledged free trade area
(FTA) comprising not only manufactures but
also agriculture and services, free capital flows
plus the Canadian membership was a substan-
tially new institutional underpinning.
Under such conditions, economic theory pre-
dicts that a FTA leads the periphery low-income
country to emerge as a net beneficiary (Ohr
1995). It will gain easier access to goods mar-
kets of the core country in relatively labour-
intensive and resource-intensive products, and it
will import know-how and capital through capi-
tal goods imports and FDI. Real convergence in
per capita income levels between the centre and
the periphery should occur provided that the
periphery country refrains from domestic poli-
cies that make local factors of production artifi-
cially expensive and noncompetitive.
All quantitative assessments on magnitude
and regional distribution of net benefits from
NAFTA clearly earmarked Mexico as the major
gainer before the crisis broke out. Tables 1 and
2 summarize these assessments with respect to
changes in real income and trade, respectively.
The unanimous finding with respect to changes
in real income was, irrespective of the empirical
Table 1 - Effects of NAFTA on Real Income (in per cent)
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aSpecific assumptions on liberalization measures are denoted as follows: (1) = removal of tariffs; (2) = (1) plus expansion
of import quotas plus liberalization of foreign direct investment inflows; (3) = removal of import quotas for textiles
(variant a) or steel (variant b); (4) = removal of NAFTA tariffs and NTBs under Coumot competition (variant a) and con-
testable markets (variant b). — "CRS = constant returns to scale. —
 cRoland-Holst et al. (1992), cited in Brown et al.
(1992). Roland-Hoist et al. keep foreign direct investment constant. —
 dTrela and Whalley (1992). —
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aUS International Trade Commission (1991). —
 bAlmon (1990), cited in Prestowitz, Jr.,
''Brown et al. (1992: Table 5). Scenario (c)























and Cohen (1991: 36-39). —
assumes the removal of tariffs on trade between the United States and Mex-
expansion of US import quotas imposed on Mexican exports of
clothing. —
dKPMG Peat Marwick (1991), cited in Prestowitz, Jr., and Cohen (1991: 38).
in Prestowitz, Jr., and Cohen (1991: 38).
Prestowitz, Jr., and Cohen (1991: 45^9),
the world.
— 'ESI (The Economic Strategy Institute o:
igriculture, food, textiles, and
—
 eAdams et al. (1991), cited
" Washington, D.C.), cited in
Cohen (1991). — SHinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson (1991). — RoW = rest of
Source: See footnotes a-g and IMF (1991).
concepts applied, that Mexico was expected to
enjoy larger gains in real income than the United
States and, except for one study, Canada, too
(Table 1). Findings for the trade side are not as
clear. Not surprisingly, Mexican exports to the
United States would expand further but given
deeper liberalization on the Mexican side than
on the US side and strong demand for US capital
goods, Mexican imports from the United States
were expected to rise, too. Hence, studies were
not uniform on the Mexican trade balance due to
NAFTA (Table 2). However, even if Mexican
import expansion would have been dominated by
capital goods and not by consumer goods, a
trade deficit would have signalled positive ef-
fects for Mexico as the capital stock would be
modernized.Exchange Rate and NAFTA Liberalization
The positive assessment of NAFTA for Mexico
became subject to revision when the peso con-
tinued to appreciate in real terms. Real appre-
ciation (see Chapter III) turned out to be a clear
impediment to Mexican exports and made im-
ports from the United States very much cheaper,
hi this respect, it acted as a substitute to import
liberalization. Domestic suppliers producing
import-competing goods faced fierce competition
from US products when they were confronted
with slow growth of domestic demand, high
borrowing costs and cost-price squeeze. Politi-
cally, domestic opposition against implementing
or even further accelerating intra-NAFTA
scheduled tariff reductions can only be recon-
ciled if the peso is allowed to find a new stable
level. The present floating can be expected to
help Mexican exports to penetrate dollar mar-
kets. It would also relax price competition for
domestic suppliers, thus making them more pre-
pared to accept further tariff cuts within
NAFTA. To private households, good news
from tariff cuts after depreciation could be con-
veyed, as such cuts would help to counteract
inflationary pressures arising from depreciation.
Partner Countries' Assistance to Mexico within
the NAFTA Framework
The best support NAFTA partner countries can
offer to Mexico is to help the country to earn
foreign exchange. The instruments are available:
the United States and Canada can accelerate
their schedules for stepwise dismantling tariffs
and nontariff barriers (NTBs) in "sensitive"
manufactures and agriculture. If the exchange
rate disequilibrium is corrected, Mexico can
follow suit. The trade parts of the Europe
Agreements of the EU with Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEECs) are examples for
such asymmetric liberalization between periph-
ery and centre. It is consistent with GATT pro-
vided that in the later part of the liberalization
period the periphery catches up in its liberaliza-
tion and arrives at par at the end. hi the absence
of exchange rate disequilibrium, a symmetric
procedure would probably be enforceable. Over-
all, accelerating cuts of tariffs and quotas in all
partner countries would be the most credible
signal that the Mexican crisis has no impact on
NAFTA.
A further lesson from the Europe Agreements
are antidumping procedures. Even without ne-
gotiating a common competition law or allowing
nonresidents to invoke national competition
laws, the accelerated trade liberalization can
help to abandon antidumping procedures against
Mexico. Predatory dumping (selling below mar-
ginal costs) and also cyclical dumping (selling
below average costs) becomes increasingly un-
likely if goods markets are liberalized and na-
tional oligopolies or monopolies disappear. The
United States and Canada can do more by ex-
plicitly renouncing to apply antidumping proce-
dures for the time being.
3 Mutual recognition of
national standards (origin country principle)
would also be helpful to trigger Mexico's com-
petitiveness within NAFTA. So would liberali-
zation of public procurement.
Finally, intra-NAFTA liberalization becomes
obsolete if there are infrastructural and bureau-
cratic bottlenecks at the Mexican-US border.
Apart from building new hardware, early liber-
alization of transit procedures and commuter
traffic plus recognition of preshipment certifi-
cates would not only contribute to faster Mexi-
can exports but would also increase the com-
petitiveness of Mexican suppliers of transport
services within total NAFTA.
The Widening of NAFTA
Strategies of the deepening of NAFTA entail the
risk to substantiate the traditionally very strong
focus of Latin American traders on the North
American market and to become decoupled from
other absorptive markets (East Asia, the EU or
intra-Latin American trade). The best insurance
for Mexico against becoming captured in the
NAFTA market is to widen NAFTA officially
toward Central and other Latin American coun-
tries, or, alternatively, to extend NAFTA rules
to nonwestern Hemisphere countries, i.e., the EU
or East Asia. The former strategy is more easily
accessible given bilateral trade agreements of
Mexico with other Latin American countries and
given the US "hub-and-spoke" approach in the
Bush initiative. Yet, economically, it is less at-
tractive for Mexico, as the trade potential within10
Latin America is somewhat lower than its poten-
tial in trading outside the Americas.
Additionally, trade patterns still differ signifi-
cantly between Mexican exports to the United
States and, e.g., its exports to Europe. Trade in
income-elastic manufactures dominates in the
exports to the United States, while commodity-
based products account for a larger share in
exports to Europe. At a time when the EU is
considering launching a new policy for trading
with Latin America that includes bilateral trade
agreements with Latin American countries,
Mexico could initiate a bilateral free trade ar-
rangement without violating NAFTA rules just
as the US continues the double track of its free
trade agreement with Canada parallel to
NAFTA. Orientation to the EU market would
not only help to diversify the export structure. It
would also be instrumental to spread exchange
risks if the ecu/dollar exchange rate offsets price
effects of the peso/dollar rate. Yet, as long as the
dollar depreciates against the EU currencies and
the peso depreciates against the dollar, exports
to Europe may gain enough momentum even in
the absence of tariff cuts (unless price advan-
tages are offset by large dependence on EU
sourcing becoming more expensive), hi this
situation, bilateral tariff reductions between
Mexico and the EU may produce little additional
effects compared with a situation in which the
ecu/dollar rate diverges from the peso/dollar
rate. The institutionally rigid way of bilateral
FTAs is unlikely to be the appropriate way to
intensify trade with Asian countries which tra-
ditionally shy away from legalized regionalism.
The multilateral way (see next chapter) seems
more recommendable for regarding trade with
these countries.
c. Worldwide Integration: The WTO
Framework
Mexican Trade Policies Applied and
Committed
Since becoming a party to the GATT in 1986,
Mexico has actively participated as a Contract-
ing Party, both by liberalizing unilaterally and
by contributing to the multilateral trade negotia-
tions under the Uruguay round, hi fact, remov-
ing tariff barriers j binding tariffs "and disman-
tling nontariff restrictions on imports, such as a
priori import licenses, proved to be among the
cornerstones of structural adjustment pro-
grammes in the second half of the eighties. As a
result, pre-Uruguay round applied tariff rates
were cut to an average of 13 per cent and bound
at a rate of 50 per cent. Hence, the margin be-
tween applied and bound rates remained fairly
high, thus allowing discretionary tariff rate
changes without impairing GATT rules. Com-
pared with 1982, when 100 per cent of tariff
lines were subject to import licensing, only less
than 2 per cent were still affected by this meas-
ure ten years later. Furthermore, direct export
subsidizes and fiscal incentives were eliminated,
while agricultural subsidies were reduced. Anti-
dumping procedures, one of the great shortcom-
ings of the GATT, have been assessed as rela-
tively clear and transparent (GATT 1993: 7).
Yet, in spite of these remarkable achieve-
ments, rationalizing trade policies has still fallen
short of completeness. Apart from large margins
between applied and bound tariff rates, tariff
escalation by the degree of processing has still
been maintained, thus protecting domestic value
added in finished goods more than indicated by
nominal legal rates. Table 3 illustrates tariff
escalation with increasing stage of processing,
as well as large tariff dispersion within indus-
tries. Variable levies and seasonal tariffs have
been imposed upon some agricultural products.
Other sectorally discriminating import restric-
tions have protected the local motor vehicle in-
Table 3 - Characteristics of Mexican Applied Nominal





























































Source: GATT (1993: 76,190).11
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Source: Hoda (1994: Tables 1-6), GATT (1994b, Appendix Table 2-6).
dustry, i.e., import ceilings, foreign exchange
balance requirements, local content rules and
restrictions on foreign investment.
The overall positive judgement on Mexico's
unilateral trade policy reforms had not to be
revised when the country tabled its offers in the
Uruguay round. Apart from commitments in all
major elements of rule-making (reforms of
GATT/WTO legal framework), rule-enforce-
ment (streamlining dispute settlement), and ex-
tension of legal scope of GATT/WTO (TRIMS,
TRIPS, services), Mexico has offered to cut
bound tariffs by an average of 27 per cent.
Hence, post-Uruguay round tariffs will amount
to 33.7 per cent (Table 4), thus substantially
reducing the margin between applied and bound
rates. Furthermore, there has been no change as
regards the complete binding of all tariff lines.
Compared with offers of all developing coun-
tries, Mexico scores well. Its depth of tariff cuts
and the percentage of bound tariffs are much
higher than those of other developing countries,
thus protecting investors against risks of short-
term tariff manoeuvring. However, given Mex-
ico's new status as an OECD member state
(since 1994), the comparison with developed
countries is more demanding and relevant, hi
this perspective, some desiderata emerge from
Table 4. Mexico is still far from one-digit bound
rates achieved by other OECD countries, and
also its reduction rate in the Uruguay round is
lower than the OECD average, hi addition,
commitments to guarantee duty-free treatment to
imports cover but a very small share of all im-
ports (only 1 per cent of total imports) — even
compared with developing countries — while, in
practice, duty-free treatment is much more ap-
plied (19 per cent of total imports in 1991;
GATT 1993: 79).
Estimates of Uruguay Round Effects on
Mexican Macroeconomic Variables
Effects of Uruguay round liberalization on
Mexico's welfare (real income), GDP and other
macroeconomic variables have been assessed by
means of so-called computable general equilib-
rium models (CGEs) calibrated and run by the
OECD (Goldin et al. 1993). CGEs depart from
base run (status quo) scenarios and simulate
scenarios of policy changes, whose net effects
are captured as deviations from the base run.
CGEs have been designed to assess the effects of
the Uruguay round on prices of individual agri-
cultural goods and on welfare of sub-regions and
individual countries including Mexico. The lib-
eralization scenarios chosen for the simulations
were first a multilateral 30 per cent reduction in
all border measures, both in agriculture and
nonagriculture including a reduction in agricul-
tural input subsidies by the same amount (partial
multilateral liberalization). Alternatively, a sec-
ond scenario assumes the multilateral removal of
all distortions in order to illustrate the maximum
potential gains from reform (full multilateral
liberalization). Finally, for illustration, the ef-
fects of full unilateral liberalization of Mexico
without reciprocity from other trading partners
have been assessed (full unilateral liberaliza-
tion). All three scenarios begin with 1985 as
base year and show liberalization effects as de-
viations from the status quo scenario in the year
2002.12
Hence, before discussing the effects of multi-
lateral liberalization, it is illustrative to present
the results of base run scenarios of the CGEs for
Mexico, i.e., what would happen until 2002 if no
liberalization occurred (Goldin et al. 1993:
Chapter 4, Table 4.7). The base run suggests
that
- the rural share of GDP in Mexico would re-
main virtually constant (1985:10 per cent;
2002:10.6 per cent);
- the rural share of the labour force would de-
crease from 33 to 23 per cent due to rural-to-
urban migration;
- the rural-urban income parity would rise from
22 (a very low level by Latin American stan-
dards) to 39 per cent. Such improvement in
income equity would be driven by the increase
in the share of agricultural exports in total
exports from 7 to 23 per cent. Behind this
relative improvement of the rural incomes
stands the assumption that Mexico's real
wages in the urban sector will become com-
pressed, particularly because the compression
of world energy prices is expected, which will
affect Mexico as a net energy exporter.
4 Such
compression will be not as strong in the rural
sector because rural factor prices partly
benefit from a reduction in input costs;
- in spite of increases in the share of agricul-
tural imports in total imports from 10 to 26
per cent, Mexico is expected to become a net
agricultural exporter by 2002.
The results of deviations from this base-run
scenario due to Uruguay round liberalization
reflect the typical first-round mechanism of
CGEs and have to be interpreted accordingly.
Under the first scenario (partial multilateral
liberalization), Mexico would enjoy increases in
both rural and urban value added (Table 5) be-
cause overall production increases. Hence, its
GDP rises. Yet, the urban sector would incur a
decline in welfare (real income) due to lower
protection of the manufacturing industry, which
stands for "urban" production. This would mean
a real devaluation in this sector necessary to
meet the balance of payments constraint. Given
the much larger share of the urban sector rela-
tive to the rural sector in Mexican GDP (9:1 in
1985), such losses would be larger than the in-
come gains for the agricultural sector, whose
implicit taxation would be removed. Income
losses are mirrored in the deterioration of Mexi-
can terms of trade. They stem from increases in
import prices (mainly due to the food sector, as
Mexico is a net food importer) not compensated
for by similar export price increases, as oil
prices decline. Thus, overall, there are small
urban-sector-driven welfare losses (much
smaller than for Brazil, for instance) as first-
round effects. Second-round effects after real
devaluation in the urban sector are more favour-
able but cannot be captured in the models. They
would bring substantial sectoral shifts in favour
for the export sector, in agricultural goods but
primarily in exportable manufactured products.
Table 5 - CGE-Based Estimates'
1 of Effects of Different
Liberalization Scenarios under the Uruguay Round on
































-0.9 0.9 1.4 8.0 5.0 -2.8
1.8 2.9 4.4 20.4 8.3 -3.4
2.5 -0.2 4.7 7.1 0.3 0.1
1.0 -fl.4 -2.0 -2.5 -1.4 -0.1
2.3 -0.4 2.2 -3.5 -1.2 -0.2
aPer cent change in the year 2002 from the base simulation. — Comprises
liberalization in the agricultural and nonagricultural sector. —
 cIncrease in
OECD growth = Growth rates of 4-5 per cent instead of 2-3 per cent. —
Increase in net transfers = assumption of increase in net transfers of $3
billion to Mexico, starting in 1993. — Partial liberalization: cut of tariffs,
NTB equivalents and input subsidies by 30 per cent. — Full liberalization:
full removal of all distortions.
Source: Goldin et al. (1993: Tables 4.8-4.13).
Maximum effects arise from the second sce-
nario (full multilateral liberalization), which of
course was neither targeted by nor achieved in
the Uruguay round and, hence, is discussed here
for illustrative purposes only. As this scenario
holds for all regions and countries, Mexico is
expected to enjoy an increase in real income that13
would amount to less than 2 per cent. Compared
with the other countries and regions (including
Brazil and other Latin America), which would
gain by 4-10 per cent, the Mexican benefits
from full multilateral liberalization appear sur-
prisingly small. This "outlier" result reflects the
fact that Mexico as an oil exporter will incure a
negative terms-of-trade shock due to the ex-
pected decline in oil prices after the liberaliza-
tion in worldwide manufacturing industries and
the ensuing decline in manufactured goods
prices. The increase in urban GDP by more than
4 per cent is remarkably higher under full lib-
eralization than in the first scenario and stems
from the elimination of unemployment. As in the
first scenario, the rural sector benefits from ris-
ing world market prices and the reduction in
implicit taxation because manufacturing import
tariffs are reduced.
The third scenario (full unilateral liberaliza-
tion) is helpful to capture effects of Mexico's
structural adjustment programmes, which in-
cluded unilateral liberalization as one of the key
elements (albeit not full liberalization as the
scenario implies but only partial). Here, an
amazing finding warrants explanation: income
gains for Mexico from unilateral liberalization
are even larger than from full multilateral lib-
eralization. This holds first because Mexico
would not face a significant decline in energy
prices because world manufacturing goods
prices would not change. Hence, its terms of
trade would remain virtually constant. Second,
as a net food importer, Mexico benefits from
unchanged food prices and thus pays for a lower
import bill than under multilateral liberalization.
Apart from the three liberalization scenarios,
the OECD model introduces two alternative
scenarios suitable to inject higher growth in the
Mexican economy. One comprises an autono-
mous net inflow of transfers of $3 billion an-
nually from 1993 onwards, financed by the
OECD countries and the Upper Income Asia
region. The second one assumes higher growth
in OECD countries (by about 1-2 percentage
points higher than in the base run simulation).
Under the first scenario, benefits to Mexico are
sizeable but, contrasting to Brazil, appear only
gradually over time with the full effect by 2002.
It is the urban sector that benefits most, particu-
larly from the demand effect: while investment is
divided between the two sectors, rural invest-
ment leads to increasing demand for urban
goods, whereas urban investment is not expected
to likewise push demand for rural goods. Hence,
this scenario would be instrumental to drive a
wedge in income parities between urban and
rural income. The same effect of deteriorating
income distribution would occur under the
"higher OECD growth" scenario. In this see-'
nario, external demand-driven growth in Mexico
would be only about 1 per cent higher than in
the base run because the simulation assumes no
change in trade distortions in Mexico, which
prevents the country from fully exploiting its
comparative advantages. Following these re-
sults, Mexico would not be well advised to rely
on a demand pull effect of autonomous higher
growth in the OECD area including the United
States.
Are the estimates plausible? An answer to this
question has to take the assumptions into ac-
count, hi this respect, two comments are at
stake:
First, it is not obvious that the assumption of
constant terms of trade, and thus declining oil
prices, would really hold if multilateral liberali-
zation were accomplished. There are other sce-
narios likely, too, that would be based on the
perception of a fixed link between manufactur-
ing prices and energy prices. For instance, rising
energy prices could be demand-driven or politi-
cally triggered by energy taxation in OECD
countries, while, at the same time, manufactur-
ing prices would rise less because of intensified
competition.
Second, and more important, the CGE models
basically capture income effects influenced by
terms of trade shifts. They cannot take account
of allocation effects, which are crucial for Mex-
ico. Should Mexico really move through a pe-
riod of declining oil prices and real devaluation,
the following period (second-round) would push
export growth of both manufactures and some
agricultural products and stimulate resources to
flow into these sectors. Beyond allocative argu-
ments, the main message from the liberalization14
scenarios focuses on more equitable income
distribution between the rural and urban sector
and hence on social peace.
Comparing the three liberalization scenarios
plus the transfer scenario and the demand pull
scenario yields the superiority of liberalization
scenarios for Latin America in general. How-
ever, Mexico's case is special because of its oil
sector. Because of its role as net oil exporter,
changing oil prices have a strong effect on its
terms-of-trade effects (Dutch disease) and thus
on its income. Therefore, full multilateral liber-
alization triggers real income gains in Mexico
because removing internal distortions more than
offsets losses due to declining oil prices. As this
scenario is for illustrative purposes only, unilat-
eral liberalization fares best next because it does
not influence world oil prices in a downward
direction. The first scenario, which we may call
the Uruguay round scenario, does not seem
overly appealing for Mexico because it brings
terms of trade losses following declining oil
prices as well as income losses for the dominant
urban sector suffering from real devaluation.
2. Investment Perspectives
a. Domestic Resource Mobilization and
Allocation
How much of the gross product is invested in-
stead of consumed and how productive invested
funds are, decides on economic growth. Both the
public and the private sector invest and short-
term effects of private investment on growth are
often found to be higher than those of the public
sector (Khan and Reinhart 1990). Yet, it is
likewise evident that a minimum amount of pub-
lic investment in inf astructure is needed to intro-
duce productive private investment. Further-
more, distinction has to be made between in-
vestment in physical and human capital, and, as
far as the contribution of human capital to
growth can be empirically isolated from the
physical capital, the effects of human capital on
economic growth in developing countries are
found to be very significant (Gundlach 1995). hi
addition, the source of financing investment has
to be taken into consideration.
Gross Domestic Capital Formation and Capital
Productivity in Mexico
Mexico's investment record has not been im-
pressive so far if it is compared with the Asian
first and second generation of emerging coun-
tries. Even if top outliers like Singapore (aver-
age investment ratio 1970-1989: 39 per cent)
and Korea (28 per cent) are refused as the rele-
vant yardstick for Mexico, also other middle-
income Asian countries invested more than
Mexico (1970-1989: 20. 4 per cent).
5 One
could assume that the liberalization period after
1985 encouraged economic agents to invest
more but the development of investment ratios
after 1983 does not support this assumption
(Table 6). Private investment ratios in Mexico
climbed by about three percentage points up to a
peak level of 16 per cent in 1993, but this was
partly offset by a decline of public investment
ratios by 2 percentage points. The investment
record of five other middle-income countries
shows higher average levels (except for Argen-
tina, which seems at par with Mexico) and more
change over time. Apart from Malaysia and
Thailand with their high investment levels, the
upward changes in Chilean investment ratios
appear most remarkable and mirror the appro-
priate reaction of investors to consistent adjust-
ment efforts. Interestingly, public investment
ratios in the rapidly growing Asian countries
were always much higher than in Mexico. This
supports the view that public investment that
does not crowd out private agents plays an
important role for productivity gains achieved
by private investment and probably exerts a
genuine influence on medium-term growth.15
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Besides investment volumes, the productivity
of investment determines economic growth. Un-
derstandably, productivity is difficult to measure
because data on capital stock and depreciation
rates are required which are usually not avail-
able. A macroeconomic proxy is the reciprocal
of the relation between cumulative investment in
a period and increments of GDP, the so-called
incremental capital/output ratio (ICOR). Similar
to the investment ratios, productivity measures
that are based on World Bank estimates do not
place Mexico in a top-score position compared
with most Asian countries (except the Philip-
pines) in the 1980-1991 period (Table 7). Given
the shortcomings of the measure, one should be
cautious to derive far-reaching conclusions con-
cerning its absolute magnitude. Yet, as short-
comings are probably systematic, an inter-coun-
try comparison is still possible. Such a compari-
son suggests that in the past Mexico did not
make full use of its invested funds. One reason
may be that real appreciation made domestic16
technologies obsolete and that the full replace-
ment of these technologies by a new capital
stock could not be achieved because Mexico
lacked access to medium-term financial re-
sources, both internally and externally.
Table 7 - Marginal Capital Productivity
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Financing Capital Formation through
Domestic Savings
Until the mid-eighties, Mexico had a ratio of
gross domestic savings to GDP that ranged
above the Latin American average but fell short
of ratios achieved by Asian countries; between
1973 and 1987, average Mexican gross domes-
tic savings amounted to 21 per cent. Measured
against the gross domestic investment of 23-24
per cent, financing by external savings amounted
to 3.7 per cent of GDP in 1973-1980 and 1.3
per cent in 1980-1987 (World Bank 1989: 153).
hi comparison, other major Latin American
countries financed the larger part of their in-
vestment by external savings.
One of the major differences between Asian
countries and Mexico, which may explain higher
savings mobilization in Asian countries is that
they enjoyed positive real interest rates, while
Mexico throughout the entire period had highly
negative rates below -5 per cent (World Bank
1989: 39). Hence, savings mobilization was
strongly discouraged in Mexico. After 1991,
when real appreciation of the peso fuelled import
demand in consumer durables, the need to fi-
nance domestic investment externally rose be-
cause private households saved less. Private
domestic savings fell until 1993 when access to
consumer credits was tightened. Under these
conditions, foreign capital inflows contributed to
finance an inrease in domestic consumption,
particularly in durables. Such coincidence of
growing current account deficit and declining
private savings provoked fears that Mexico
would face difficulties to generate foreign ex-
change to service debt (World Bank 1994: 331).
Fears culminated in 1994 and exposed a particu-
larly risky element in Mexico's external financ-
ing, due to the maturity structure of inflows.
b. Structure of Capital Inflows
During the 1980s, Mexico's current account
deficit remained moderate in the range of 1 per
cent of GDP. Compared with all low-income and
middle-income countries (1.4 per cent), this was
a very low level. Between 1991 and 1994, how-
ever, the current account deficit has virtually
exploded from 6.5 per cent in 1991-1993 to 8.2
per cent in 1994 (World Bank 1995: 81). This
rise was the result of an unprecedented change in
the sectoral composition of inflows, a change
from long-term financing through foreign in-
vestment to shorter-term financing through port-
folio investment, hi 1988, the portfolio invest-
ment amounted to only 6 per cent of FDI inflows
in Mexico. Between 1988 and 1993, the ratio
rose steadily from 11 per cent in 1989, 255 per
cent in 1991, 436 per cent in 1992 and 568 per
cent in 1993. The trend was broken in the first
quarter of 1994, when portfolio inflows began to
decline sharply. Second-quarter portfolio in-
vestment amounted to only 14 per cent of first-
quarter inflows,
6 and short-term dollar denomi-
nated debt became a very important factor in
financing the current account deficit.
It is important to note that neither the speed of
the shift nor the shift itself was unique to Mex-
ico. Despite wide differences in macroeconomic
policies and economic performance between
Latin American countries, most countries be-
came subject to portfolio investment inflows.
Yet, Mexico received almost three-quarters of
the portfolio investment of all Latin American
countries by 1991 and more than 80 per cent in
1993. Similarly to Mexico, capital inflows in the
other countries of destination were accompanied
by appreciation of the real exchange rate,
booming markets for nontradables such as real17
estate, bullish stock markets, an accumulation of
foreign reserves and a more optimistic assess-
ment of the debt overhang situation as shown by
the increase in secondary market prices for for-
eign loans. Yet, from the very beginning, fears
circulated that some of the inflows were of the
hot money variety and would be reversed on
short notice, thus sparking a domestic financial
crisis. Such reversals were feared to become
very strong — and they indeed materialized in
late 1994 — in a situation in which internal
inconsistencies and assessments of unsustain-
ability of macroeconomic conditions in the host
countries coincided with external pull factors,
such as increases in real interest rates in inter-
national capital markets or liberalization of port-
folio markets in other potential host countries.
7
To delink from such validity, it is of utmost
importance that Mexico attracts FDI which does
not only reflect a change in ownership but fi-
nances additional capital formation in a sustain-
able way. This is why special attention is to be
paid to Mexico's attractiveness for foreign in-
vestors in competition with other potential hosts.
c. Attractiveness for Foreign Direct
Investment
In the last few years Mexico's current account
deficit became increasingly financed by portfolio
investment while the share covered by FDI de-
clined. However, this is not to say that Mexico
was unsuccessful in attracting more FDI in the
early 1990s than before. A three years average
of FDI annual inflows during 1991-1993 com-
pared with 1988-1990 yields an almost doubling
of FDI inflows. This rise continued until the first
half of 1994.
8 However, given that FDI flows to
many Asian and also Latin American countries
has risen to unprecedented level since 1990 (BIZ
1994: 102), Mexico's record must not necessar-
ily be outstanding. To put absolute increases in
FDI flows to Mexico into perspective, it is help-
ful to have a closer look at the regional distribu-
tion of major home countries' FDI in order to
analyse whether or not Mexico improved its po-
sition as a host relative to other hosts. Therefore,
in the following, three major home countries'
investment stocks in Mexico are analysed rela-
tive to the development of these countries' FDI
worldwide: the United States, Germany and
Japan.
9
Mexico's Position in US FDI
According to SECOFI, the Mexican Secretary
of Commerce and Industrial Development, the
United States accounted for almost 62 per cent
of total cumulative FDI in Mexico in 1992, fol-
lowed by the United Kingdom (6.5 per cent) and
Germany (5.8 per cent). Switzerland, Japan,
France and Spain ranged next (Deutsch-Mexika-
nische Industrie- und Handelskammer 1992).
Therefore, the attractiveness of Mexico for US
FDI is of outstanding importance for the general
locational competitiveness of Mexico. Table 8
provides a breakdown of the Mexican share in
US worldwide FDI by industries from 1980
(before the debt crisis) to 1993. The following
findings emerge:
- For all industries, Mexico's share in US FDI
is U-curve-shaped. It declined during the pe-
riod of crisis and adjustment, had a turning
point by 1988 and rose until 1993. Yet, there
was no additional gain in share. Mexico re-
gained what it had lost and stood exactly at
the same level in 1993 as in 1980: it ac-
counted for 2.8 per cent of US FDI.
- Sectorally, there were different shifts between
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing, basi-
cally services. Mexico became slightly more
attractive as a host in manufacturing (1980:
5.1 per cent, 1993: 5.4 per cent with the
slump in 1987/88) but lost in service indus-
tries. Investment in the oil sector remained
marginal due to access restrictions.
- The food industry, which showed the only
double-digit share in 1993, and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the motor vehicle industry (transport
equipment), were positive outliers because the
upswing in their U-curve was greater than the
decline.
- Industries in which Mexico lost in attractive-
ness regardless of the swing are primary and
fabricated metals and also electric and elec-
tronic equipment. Losses in the primary and
fabricated metals may be natural and less
troublesome because this is a less skill-inten-18









































































































































































































Source: US Department of Commerce (various issues).
sive industry that is declining in US total
manufacturing FDI. Countries with a lower
income than Mexico have improved their lo-
cational competitiveness. The decline in elec-
tric and electronic equipment should give
more rise to concern. This is an industry with
a rising share in total US manufacturing FDI
and with increasing amounts of funds invested
in Asian countries. Some of them might focus
on purely labour-intensive activities with few
skill requirements but other parts might ab-
sorb more human capital and, hence, should
be important for improving Mexico's "tech-
nological base".
Overall, until 1993, Mexico did not yet made
outstanding progress in attracting much more
US FDI in competition with other hosts than it
lost before. However, completing NAFTA will
still provide much scope for gains in attractive-
ness.
Mexico's Position in German FDI
As in the United States, Mexico's share in
German total FDI declined from the peak level
before the debt crisis until 1987, and has recov-
ered partially since then. However, with 1.2 per
cent of total FDI compared with 1.6 per cent in
1981, there was no full recovery as in the United
States (Table 9). The Mexican motor vehicle
industry proved to be the most important target
for both German and US companies, but this
industry failed to attract the same share of total
German FDI that it had before the debt crisis,
when Mexico accounted for almost 10 per cent
of total German foreign investment in this indus-
try. Two other industries, chemicals and electri-
cal machinery, did better in terms of exceeding
the pre-debt crisis level. These industries
reached a share of 2-3 per cent each but this
share remained much lower than for investment
in the motor vehicle industry. Investment in food
industries, which proved to be the most attrac-
tive industry for US investment, did not play any
significant role in German FDI.
To put the overall level of German investment
in Mexico (little more than 1 per cent) in a right
perspective, one has to bear in mind that Ger-
man FDI in general mirrors a clear bias toward
investment in OECD countries. Such bias can
neither be observed in the United States nor in
other OECD countries. In 1992, only 9.5 per
cent of total German FDI stock accrued to in-
vestment in developing countries (including the
OPEC countries and the emerging East and
Southeast Asian countries but excluding China).
US investment outside the OECD countries, for
instance, amounted to more than 30 per cent. If
Mexico's attractiveness is assessed only in com-
parison with FDI in other developing countries,
Mexico's share in German FDI scores substan-
tially better than in US investment (13 per cent
compared with only 9 per cent).
Nevertheless, German investment in Mexico
has lacked dynamism in recent years. Since
1989, when the post-adjustment period began,
Mexico's share in German FDI has remained
stagnant. Neither the NAFTA foundation nor the
substantial efforts in domestic adjustment suc-
cess could trigger more German investment in19


















































































































































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank Die Kapitalverflechtung der Untemehmen mit dem Ausland nach Landern und Wirtschafis-
zweigen (April 1989-April 1992), Deutsche Bundesbank Kapitalverflechtung mit demAusland (May 1994, May 1995).
Mexico than in other host countries. Recent FDI
flow figures for 1993 and 1994 do not display a
more encouraging result. In 1993, net flows of
German FDI to Mexico amounted to DM 2 mil-
lion only (including an net outflow of reinvested
profits from Mexico of DM 50 million), while in
1994 net flows to Mexico comprised DM 163
million or 10 per cent of net flows to all develop-
ing countries (0.6 per cent of total German net
FDI flows abroad) (Deutsche Bundesbank 1995:
46). Given the rapid increase in German FDI
flows in general and to individual countries in
particular (for instance, European transforma-
tion countries and China), this disenchanting de-
velopment in fact is a challenge to Mexico's lo-
cational competitiveness.
Mexico's Position in Japanese FDI
Mexico's position in Japanese FDI deviates
strongly from its position in US and German
FDI in a negative direction. Slight absolute in-
creases cannot obscure the fact that only 0.5 per
cent of the total stock of approved Japanese FDI
accrued to Mexico at end March 1994 (accumu-
lated fiscal years 1951-1993) (Japan, June
issues).
1
0 In addition to the very low level, it is
the trend that causes concern. Since 1985, when
Mexico achieved to attract a share of 1.6 per
cent of the Japanese FDI stock, the trend has
steadily been negative, in spite of the Mexican
recovery in the second half of the eighties. Be-
tween 1985 and 1995, the trend in Japanese
investment in the United States was rising (from
30.2 to 41.9 per cent). This signals that neither
Mexican GATT entry nor the foundation of
NAFTA and the adjustment efforts could induce
Japanese companies to invest at the low-income
periphery of NAFTA.
As this trend runs against those observed for
US and German investment showing either full
or partial recovery from the shock of the debt
crisis, there is reason to assume specific charac-
teristics of Japanese investment pattern. One
reason could be the relatively high share of in-
vestment in nonmanufacturing industries pre-
ferred by Japanese companies (primary sector
plus real estate and other services). As long as
these sectors were closed to nonresidents in
Mexico, FDI was refrained from entering the
Mexican market. The second aspect, likely to be
more important, could be the relatively high skill
requirements of Japanese investment in sophisti-
cated industries, which could be more easily met
in the United States than in Mexico. Whatever
reasons a detailed analysis of motives of Japa-
nese investors would display, it remains a chal-
lenging experience for Mexico to see rising parts
of Japanese investment bypassing the country,
while the amount of Japanese worldwide invest-
ment has risen by more than 20 per cent annu-
ally since 1985.
3. Policy Recommendations
The investigations into trade and investment
perspectives suggest the following recommenda-
tions:20
(1) hi future, unilateral trade policy reforms
in Mexico should be targeted to reduce still ex-
isting discrimination between sectors and, within
the manufacturing sector, between industries.
Given past achievements in trade liberalization,
neutrality in incentives through a uniform pro-
tection level now appears more important than
further liberalization across the board. This
would also help to diversify the existing pattern
of exports.
(2) Developing the potential of the rural sec-
tor should receive more attention. The rise in
world market agricultural prices that will follow
the implementation of the Uruguay round will
provide additional incentives. It is known from
many countries that the productivity potential in
the rural sector is vast and can be mobilized
without large amounts of capital inflows.
(3) Mexican exports outside the primary sec-
tor are strongly concentrated on US demand for
consumer durables. To lower the dependence on
US business cycles in general and on interest
rates for consumer loans in the United States in
particular, regional and sectoral diversification
of exports should be envisaged. Asian and
European markets are prime candidates for both
sourcing and export outlays. Sectorally, agricul-
tural products and products from capital and
intermediate goods industries would be condu-
cive to broadening the export base.
(4) Relatively low investment productivity in
the past has been one of the weaknesses of
Mexico's growth path. To shape this unsatisfac-
tory result, it is necessary to channel future in-
vestment funds more into sectors that generate
or save foreign exchange earnings. It cannot be
excluded that the boom period fuelled investment
in inward-oriented activities, which absorbed
foreign exchange on a net basis rather than gen-
erating it
(5) Past FDI inflows from the United States,
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom do
not reveal that investors could be convinced to
prefinance a medium-term improvement of
Mexico's locational competitiveness due to
NAFTA and other institutional commitments.
To anchor Mexico as an attractive host in loca-
tional decisions of investors, concerted actions
of established companies, trading houses, banks
and institutional investors seem appropriate.
Preferably, such actions should concentrate on
potential investors in Asia and Europe, hi this
respect, perspectives of a new EU concept for
economic relations with Latin America (includ-
ing plans of a bilateral free trade agreement be-
tween the EU and Mexico) may stimulate trade
and investment flows, provided that the effects
of easier access to EU markets are not jeopard-
ized by adverse supply-side conditions in Mex-
ico.
(6) Mexico has proven to be a relatively suc-
cessful exporter of nonfactor services. As such
services are one of the most rapidly growing
segments of world trade, it is important to fur-
ther improve Mexico's competitiveness in serv-
ices. For this purpose, it is helpful to identify
broad categories of Mexico's exports of services
(for instance, consumer services (travel, passen-
ger transport), trade-related services (merchan-
dise transport), financial services and other busi-
ness services) and their determinants in order to
strengthen the export base.
(7) The experiences of Asian NICs suggest
that early outward orientation of domestic capi-
tal helps to secure access to export markets, hi
this respect, Mexican investment abroad (outside
the United States) is still relatively small
1
1 and
offers scope for extension.
Finally, macroeconomic stability is necessary
but not sufficient if Mexico is to exploite its
long-term potential. It is the competitiveness of
Mexico's immobile factors of production (its
unskilled labour, its regulatory system, its infra-
structure) that will decide whether or not Mexico
can successfully compete for mobile resources in
the world economy, hi addition to domestic
policies, assistance can be provided through
OECD membership, which contributes to
macroeconomic and institutional guidance. Fur-
thermore, important trading partners as the EU
will contribute to Mexico's welfare if they rec-
ognize that more institutionalized relations with
Mexico are helpful to lower costs of information
and uncertainty and thus to stabilize expecta-
tions on Mexico's future development.21
III. Short-Run Distortions: The Monetary Side
1. The Failure of Exchange-Rate-
Based Stabilization
From 1988 to December 1994, the Mexican
exchange rate policy went through three main
phases.
1
2 First, after an initial devaluation of
38.9 per cent, the peso/dollar rate was fixed.
Second, the authorities shifted toward increased
flexibility by adopting a pre-announced crawling
peg after January 1989: the peso/dollar rate was
allowed to depreciate by 1 (old) peso
1
3 per day
in 1989, 80 cents per day in 1990, 40 cents per
day in 1991, and 20 cents per day in 1992 until
October, when the speed of the crawl was in-
creased again to 40 cents per day. Third, an
exchange rate band was adopted in November
1991. This band differed from those of other
countries like Israel and Chile
1
4 in several re-
spects:
- While the band's ceiling was subject to a
daily pre-announced depreciation by a fixed
amount, the band's floor remained fixed.
Consequently, the width of the band was in-
creasing with time.
- The rate of crawl of the band's upper limit
was specified in nominal terms, a fixed
amount of cents per day, rather than in per
cents.
- There was no official announcement of a cen-
tral parity. Only the band's upper and lower
limits were officially announced. The authori-
ties also announced every day before trading
began their narrow band target range for that
day. In practice, interventions inside the band
were the rule rather than the exception, and
the exchange rate stayed near the middle of
the band most of the time.
Notwithstanding these special features, the
Mexican exchange rate policy and the related
macroeconomic reforms laid down in the Pacto
agreements
1
5 fall in the category of exchange-
rate-based stabilization attempts. The basic ar-
gument for such a stabilization policy is that a
nominal anchor in the form of a fixed exchange
rate or a pre-announced rate of depreciation,
lower than the difference of inflation at home
and abroad (active crawl), imports the anti-
inflationary reputation of a foreign currency by
tying the hands of the own monetary authorities.
If discretionary policy is ruled out and monetary
policy is determined by the foreign central bank,
the credibility of the reform will improve, pri-
vate agents will adjust at once, and inflation will
decrease to the level of the stable currency
(Schweickert 1994a). However, the experience
that developing countries made with exchange-
rate-based stabilization is in sharp contrast with
the appearing features of the theoretical concept:
an expansionary first phase was typically ended




The question is whether the concept or an in-
consistent implementation is to be blamed for the
failure of exchange-rate-based stabilization in
Mexico. This question is not only relevant for
academic but especially for practical reasons.
The trade and investment perspectives outlined
in Chapter II crucially depend on a stable
macroeconomic framework, i.e., a macroeco-
nomic policy that provides a noninflationary en-
vironment (stabilization) and a stable develop-
ment of the real exchange rate close to its equi-
librium (structural adjustment). These two tar-
gets are presently at risk and the role that the
past exchange rate policy played in this devel-
opment is to be identified in order to determine
solutions for the future that allow the trade and
investment potential to be realized.
a. Stabilization versus Structural
Adjustment
A look at the development of macroeconomic
indicators summarized in Table 10 reveals that
Mexico repeated the "traditional" pattern of
exchange-rate-based stabilization programmes.
The real exchange rate appreciated because the
nominal devaluation was kept low, while infla-
tion inertia was quite substantial. Two explana-
tions can be offered. First, wage increases were
— with the exception of 1988 — significantly22
Table 10 - Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization in Mexico: Macroeconomic Indicators,
Nominal exchange rate (NEX)
a
peso:dollar
Consumer prices in Mexico
(CPMEX)
Consumer prices in the United
States (CPUS)
Real exchange rate (CPMEX-
CPUS-NEX)
b
Wages in Mexico (WAMEX)
Wages in the United States (WAUS)
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Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (various issues), IMF IMF Survey (6 February 1995), EIU Country Profile
Mexico (1993/94), EIU Country Report Mexico (1st quarter 1995), own calculations.
higher than consumer price increases, allowing
costs to push. Second, monetary expansion was
driven by the inflow of foreign exchange due to
the dramatic increase in capital inflows, allow-
ing demand to pull. The expansionary effect of
capital inflows translated into positive real
growth rates and, together with the real appre-
ciation, produced a large trade deficit, which
reached 5.2 per cent of GDP in 1994 (current
account deficit: 8.2 per cent).
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Generally, the internal and external equilib-
rium of the Mexican economy became more and
more dependent on the sustainability of capital
inflows and — as Table 10 shows — especially
on the sustainability of foreign portfolio invest-
ment Portfolio investment, however, is a mixed
bag with respect to its stability (Reisen 1995).
Investment by pension funds and life insurance
companies can be taken as long-term investment,
since these funds follow a buy-and-hold strategy
rather than a trading strategy in the emerging
stock markets. Unlike banks and most other
investors, pension funds and life insurance com-
panies benefit from regular inflows of funds on a
contractual basis and from long-term liabilities
(with no premature withdraws of funds). To the
contrary, equity-related investment by domestic
residents with overseas holdings, by private
foreign investors and from managed funds
(country funds and mutual funds) are largely
governed by cyclical determinants and oriented
at short-term returns. In the course of the early
1990s, the decline in returns on riskless assets in
the United States and the OECD countries
brought much speculative money to the emerg-
ing stock markets. What is more, with the need23
to have sufficient cash to pay off clients redeem-
ing their holdings, a widespread crisis forces
fund managers to sell in markets totally unre-
lated to the origin of the crisis.
Limiting the flexibility of the nominal ex-
change rate also intensifies the risk related to
other capital flows. If the exchange rate system
is credible, foreign investors can earn signifi-
cantly higher interest rates than at home, while
their risk is limited by interventions of the do-
mestic monetary authorities in order to contain
the nominal exchange rate within its band. In
Mexico, this has led to an ex-post interest rate to
be earned on Mexican deposits by American
investors that was about 12.5 percentage points
higher than the interest rate on American depos-
its. This helped to pull speculative, short-term
capital into Mexico.
The riskiness of Mexico's external position
materialized during 1994. The regional upheav-
als and the elections, together with some uncer-
tainty about the possibility to refinance short-
term government debt, created sufficient uncer-
tainty for portfolio and other capital flows to
change their direction, and the real exchange rate
became overvalued.
1
8 This demonstrates that the
risk related to an exchange-rate-based stabiliza-
tion programme is rather due to the concept. If
capital flows out, as was the case in 1988, when
the peso/dollar rate was fixed, the programme is
ended because a monetary contraction should be
avoided. If capital flows in, as has been the case
since 1989, monetary expansion slows down
inflation convergence and, hence, speeds up real
appreciation leading to a large trade gap, which
makes a "soft landing" increasingly difficult.
This is not to say, that there have been no
components of the Mexican economic policy
that can be criticized because alternative policies
may have helped to speed up inflation conver-
gence. Before proceeding to this discussion, a
general statement is in order. It is relatively easy
to identify such inconsistencies ex post, and it is
very likely that without the political disturbances
of 1994 foreign investors and economists would
still live very comfortably with the Mexican
reform model. The following discussion is never-
theless important for identifying optimal future
exchange rate strategies.
b. Complementary Policy Measures
Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy
The type of exchange-rate-based stabilization
implemented in Mexico allowed two degrees of
freedom with respect to the conduct of macro-
economic policy: (i) the rate of the crawl of the
nominal exchange rate could be adjusted, and
(ii) money supply could be manipulated via the
domestic component of the money base. Over
the period 1988-1994 the use of both instru-
ments shows considerable volatility.
Most of the real appreciation during the pe-
riod took place in 1988, when the rate of the
crawl was zero and monetary policy was ex-
pansionary although net losses of foreign assets
were significant (Table 10). This was clearly an
inconsistent policy given the priority of the sta-
bilization target. The concept of exchange-rate-
based stabilization would have required that
monetary contraction forces inflation down as
quickly as possible in order to meet the stabiliza-
tion target and in order not to let a dramatic real
appreciation disturb structural adjustment.
The correction of this policy, which took
place in 1989, went into the right direction: the
rate of the crawl was increased to 1 peso per day
and monetary policy was tightened. This policy
resulted in a passive crawling peg, i.e., the dif-
ferential between Mexican and US inflation was
compensated by the nominal devaluation and the
real exchange rate was kept constant with a
trade deficit of negligible amount and a real
growth rate of 3.3 per cent (Table 10). Hence,
the Mexican economy had been in internal and
external equilibrium at that time, and it is rea-
sonable to argue — by hindsight — that this
policy mix would have provided a stable macro-
economic framework. However, Mexican
macroeconomic policy changed course again in
1990, leading to its central flaw, i.e., the exces-
sive use of the exchange rate as a nominal an-
chor (Bergsten and Cline 1995): while the rate
of crawl was lowered, monetary policy became
more expansionist again, starting a new round of
increasing inflation and real appreciation.
With respect to monetary policy, there was at
least a chance to be more restrictive (Brand and
R6"hm 1995). With the exception of the years24
1992 and 1993 and to some extent also of 1991,
monetary policy tried to sterilize reserve out-
flows but not reserve inflows, thus increasing
inflation pressures. This can be seen when com-
paring the development of net foreign assets and
of money supply Ml (Table 10). It implies that
the fluctuations of money supply were not com-
pletely unavoidable as would have been the case
in a currency board regime (see the discussion of
the Argentine case below) but were to some
extent produced by an active monetary policy
that changed course several times and was not
strictly oriented at keeping monetary expansion
as low as possible in order to force inflation




Fiscal consolidation is a cornerstone for estab-
lishing the credibility of an exchange-rate-based
stabilization programme. It is necessary to allow
the monetary policy to be determined by the
exchange rate target, and it convinces foreign
investors that their funds are not allocated —
either directly or indirectly — into the public
pockets. The Mexican reform efforts in this
respect were clearly outstanding (OECD 1992).
From 1988 onwards, the financial deficit de-
clined rapidly until the gap was closed in 1991,
largely on account of a steady decline in the
expenditure to GDP ratio, which in 1991 was 15
percentage points below that of 1982, while the
revenue ratio even declined.
Between 1988 and 1993, the revenue ratio
continued its downward trend, which was the
result of a tax reform that rather focused on the
simplification of the tax system and on lower tax
rates than on increasing fiscal revenue:
(1) The corporate tax base has been rational-
ized through full inflation indexation, the system
of multiple corporate tax rates, ranging from 5
to 42 per cent, has been replaced by a uniform
rate of 35 per cent, the same rate as that charged
on capital gains. Only the real portion of interest
payments (receipts) has been made deductible
(taxable). The inflation adjustment of deprecia-
tion and inventories variations has also been
simplified and made automatic. Additionally, the
exemption of agricultural and transport sectors
from corporate taxation has been ended and a
minimum corporate income tax established.
(2) The number of personal income tax
brackets has been reduced from twelve to eight,
and the top rate has been lowered to 35 per cent,
thus equalizing marginal corporate and top per-
sonal income tax rates and consequently reduc-
ing the scope for tax arbitrage. The brackets
have been indexed to inflation. Interest income
of individual residents has been made subject to
a withholding tax of 1.4 per cent of the underly-
ing principal. However, the extensive list of tax-
exempt income components has remained one
key feature of the personal income tax system.
(3) Efforts have also been made to increase
the efficiency of VAT taxation. The standard
rate was reduced to 10 per cent in 1991 as part
of the government's anti-inflationary incomes
policy. The special rate in border regions has
been replaced by the standard rate, leaving food-
stuffs as the only exemption favoured by a zero
rate. VAT collection has been improved by
transferring its administration from states to the
federal government, which uses banks to collect
the tax.
Although this surely constitutes a straightfor-
ward fiscal reform programme, the development
of the structure of government revenue and ex-
penditure reveals two unfavourable trends be-
tween 1988 and 1993 that are worth to mention:
(1) Revenue from VAT showed a negative
trend. Contrary to other Latin American reform
countries like Argentina and Chile (Burgess and
Stern 1993: Table 3.1, Schweickert 1994a),
indirect taxation obviously did not enjoy a high
priority in Mexican tax policy. The advantage of
the VAT is that it discriminates against con-
sumption expenditure, an effect that can dampen
the typical consumption boom to be observed in
all exchange-rate-based stabilization pro-
grammes and, hence, to foster domestic savings
and investment. Additionally, ample evidence
with tax reforms in developing countries shows
that the short-term revenue effect of a tax reform
can be maximized by focusing on indirect taxa-
tion (Schweickert 1995a).
(2) While current expenditure increased from
5.6 to 9.8 per cent of GDP, capital expenditure25
declined from 3.6 to 2.7 per cent of GDP. On
the one hand, this reflects the ongoing privatiza-
tion process, which shifts public investment into
the private sector. On the other hand, it can at
least be questioned whether it is appropriate for
a country like Mexico to reduce public invest-
ment to OECD levels (OECD 1992) rather than
financing meaningful investment in infrastruc-
ture and public services in order to improve the




A well-developed and efficient financial system
helps to ease structural adjustment problems
because it provides the financial resources to
restructure domestic supply when relative prices
change. This is of special importance if ex-
change rate flexibility is limited. If the real ex-
change rate appreciates, as is typically the case
in the first phase of exchange-rate-based stabili-
zation, efficiency-enhancing investment in ex-
portable or import substitutes provides a stable
source of foreign exchange inflows substituting
for temporary capital inflows in a later phase of
the programme, i.e., the supply response substi-
tutes for a real devaluation.
The past few years have brought fundamental
change to the Mexican financial sector (EIU, a
1994/95). Apart from liberalizing interest rates
and credit terms and eliminating obligatory
lending to the public sector, new financial in-
struments and new financial institutions have
been created. It has been estimated that at the
end of 1994 there were around 50 commercial
banks in operation compared with just 19 two
years earlier, hi 1993, after authorization was
given for the establishment of new domestic
banks the total number went up to 30 and in
1994 the government granted licenses to sub-
sidiaries of banks operating in the United States
and Canada. There has also been a significant
increase in the number of other financial entities
since 1988.
Thus, Mexico's financial system has been
strengthened by its liberalization and deepening.
Major contributing factors of this strengthening
were the privatization of much of the financial
system and the establishment of a more inde-
pendent central bank.
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(1) Mexico's financial sector is still small
compared with East Asian countries (Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) and other
NAFTA countries. While market capitalization
of Mexican financial institutions is about 60 per
cent of these countries, the assets as per cent of
GDP are only 44 per cent (26 per cent) for
deposit money institutions and 23 per cent (11
per cent) for private nonbank finance companies
of the asset ratio of the corresponding Asian
(American) institutions.
(2) The costs of debt and equity finance are
very high for most firms. Bank's prime borrow-
ers paid real interest rates of almost 18 per cent,
while small and medium-size firms paid over 25
per cent at the end of 1993. Among the reasons
for such high rates are high bank operating costs
and insufficient competitive pressure on finan-
cial intermediation margins.
(3) Although the newly privatized commercial
banks have managed to build up their capital
bases to meet Basle requirements, they have
been similarly plagued by bad debts (addi-
tionally contributing to the high lending rates).
By mid-1994, bad debts on their books were
equivalent to no less than 96 per cent of paid-up
capital and were proving to be an obstacle to
new lending.
(4) The government has greatly strengthened
the system of prudential supervision. This is im-
portant because in the past no bank failure was
allowed. But the complex structure of the finan-
cial conglomerates that predominantly provide
the financial services in Mexico makes oversight
and monitoring a difficult task. Efficient super-
vision also suffers from the existence of five fi-
nancial regulatory bodies with overlapping juris-
dictions and a lack of centralized and standard-
ized information.
The Mexican stock market had been reformed
even before the banking sector was privatized
and deregulated (EIU Country Profile Mexico
(1994/95)). There has been the development of
new products and the opening up of the market
to foreigners. Under new rules, which came into
force in November 1989, foreigners are allowed26
to purchase almost any stock through a "neu-
tral" trust, although they still do not have voting
rights, hi 1990, further reforms allowed foreign-
ers to take a stake of up to 30 per cent in stock
market intermediaries. It is, therefore, not sur-
prising that the stock market index changed from
boom in early 1994, when capital inflows were
still positive, to bust in late 1994, when foreign
investors withdrew their funds.
The problem is not the mere size of inflowing
funds but their source (Reisen 1995). In Asia,
the equity-related share of portfolio flows is
higher than in Latin America, but it is at the
same time likely to come from more stable
sources. Pensions funds and insurance compa-
nies often limit their investment towards those
countries that have been assigned investment-
grade credit ratings by rating agencies such as
Moody's and Standard & Poor's. Currently,
only Chile and Colombia in Latin America carry
the investment grade stipulated by the portfolio
allocation guidelines of pension funds, while in
Asia the grade is enjoyed by China, Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. This
explains why by 1993 UK pension funds (for
which such a breakdown is available) had in-
vested 4.6 per cent of their assets in Asia, com-
pared with only 0.6 per cent in Latin America.
Although Chile and Colombia and the Asian
countries are likely to benefit from this more
stable type of equity-related investment, they
still restrict short-term capital inflows. The
opening of equity portfolio investment to for-
eigners in a situation where the country still has
a minor credit rating — as was the case in Mex-
ico — is at least a high risk strategy.
Labour Market Policies
Labour market and wage flexibility are of cru-
cial importance for the monetary and exchange
rate policy to achieve the macroeconomic tar-
gets. Real wage flexibility is necessary in both
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes to
achieve real exchange rate adjustment. But the
pressure on nominal wage flexibility is higher in
a fixed exchange rate regime, where the real
exchange rate can only be adjusted via adjust-
ment of nontraded goods prices, i.e., the price of
labour in the first place. The same holds for a
liberal trade regime and a liberal institutional
framework for foreign direct investment.
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While a liberal trade system helps to bring do-
mestic prices down as fast as possible in order to
stop the real appreciation effect of fixing the
exchange rate, a liberal institutional framework
is necessary to provide stable finance for cover-
ing emerging trade deficits. Some of these issues
have already been analysed in Chapter II.
Hence, the following concentrates on labour-
related policies.
In Mexico, wage negotiations have been part
of the macroeconomic reform programme be-
cause guidelines for wage adjustment have been
included in the Pacto agreements. This would
lead one to expect that wages would be adjusted
consistent with the rate of crawl of the nominal
anchor, i.e., the exchange rate. If, e.g., the rate
of crawl is 0.0004 pesos per day this would
result in an annual depreciation of 4 per cent.
Given a US inflation rate of 5 per cent, this
would result in a target for the domestic inflation
rate of 9 per cent. Wage inflation could be
higher to the extent
- that an additional devaluation could occur
because the present exchange rate has some
room to move within the band,
- that inflation of nontraded goods prices is
higher than average inflation, and
- that the equilibrium real exchange rate ap-
preciates.
Especially in 1990 and 1991, the realized
wage increases exceeded appropriate levels
(Table 10). As a consequence, the wage spread
between Mexican wages and US wages in US
dollar became even larger than the real exchange
rate appreciation measured by purchasing power
parity. Taking 1987 as the base year, this led to
the result that at the end of 1994 the nominal
devaluation and the low inflation rate wiped out
the foregoing real appreciation completely, while
Mexican wages still had increased by 39.0 per
cent relative to US wages.
This observation fits into the picture that —
despite Mexico's comprehensive programme of
liberalization and structural reform — the la-
bour market has remained relatively regulated
(World Bank unpublished material). The exist-27
ing framework of labour legislation has resulted
in significant inefficiencies:
- High explicit and implicit labour costs have
presented both a barrier to the growth of for-
mal sector employment, and a burden for in-
ternational competitiveness. Total nonwage
labour costs would add 31 or 50 per cent if
current programmes were adequately financed
by contributions. The comparable costs in
Chile are 21 per cent and even in OECD
countries only Spain, France, and Italy are
above the 31 per cent level but not above the
50 per cent level.
- Excessive restrictions against internal and
external labour mobility have hampered pro-
ductivity growth. Large mandated severance
payments have substituted for a well-designed
pension system and an adequate unemploy-
ment insurance. Within the OECD, only
Spain and Italy, both equipped with highly
rigid labour markets, mandate equally large
severance payments.
The outcome of the system is not only ineffi-
cient but also inequitable. It discriminates in
favour of middle- and upper-middle-income
classes employed in the formal sector and
against labour in informal and rural sectors, i.e.,
the poorest and the worst equipped for the struc-
tural changes inevitably accompanying Mexico's
further integration into the world market. There-
fore, labour market reforms comprising lower
mandatory nonwage costs and the introduction
of a pension system and an unemployment insur-
ance, e.g., like in Chile and Argentina, are ur-
gently required to ease real integration and
macroeconomic adjustment. Additional meas-
ures should comprise human capital develop-
ment and the modernization of the collective
bargaining framework allowing more flexibility
at sectoral and firm levels.
Evaluation of the 1995 Reforms
The run down of foreign exchange reserves in
December 1994 forced the Mexican authorities
to switch to a floating exchange rate regime with
limited interventions. The macroeconomic re-




Restrictive fiscal policy. Budget targets have
been modified from a balanced budget to a sur-
plus of 0.5 per cent of GDP. To achieve this,
fiscal policies followed the traditional lines, i.e.,
expenditures were to be reduced with greater
spending cuts in investment than in current ex-
penditure. The devaluation effect is expected to
be neutral with respect to revenue, since the
higher cost of external debt service will be offset
by greater revenues from petroleum sales. This
fiscal package had to be adjusted in March by
raising the VAT rate from 10 to 15 per cent,
additional price increases of publicly provided
goods, and additional spending cuts.
Restrictive monetary policy. After exchange
rate targeting broke down, monetary policy
goals became the only nominal anchor. There-
fore, the monetary programme establishes a limit
on the growth of net domestic assets of new
pesos 10 billion, which is equivalent to 17 per
cent of the monetary base at the end of 1994.
Wage restraint. Initially, the wage accords
included in the Pacto signed in September 1994,
which targeted a total rise in wages of about 10
per cent (including productivity bonus and tax
credits), were upheld. However, the modification
of the macroeconomic programme in March
1995 appeared without the traditional consensus
of the signatories of the Pacto and stressed the
need for an agreement on collective bargaining
contracts through free negotiation between the
respective parties at the company level.
Structural measures. To complete the ad-
justment, the programme also includes new pri-
vatizations, a further opening of the financial
system to foreign investment and increased de-
regulation. To prevent inefficiencies of financial
contracts stemming from uncertainties about the
future inflation rate, units of investment (uni-
dades de inversi6n; UDIs) were introduced. This
is basically an instrument to index financial in-
struments because it provides a unit of account
that is adjusted daily to the actual inflation rate.
If properly implemented, the 1995 programme
corrects much that has been criticized above. It
maintains fiscal consolidation, while increasing
the tax burden on private consumption, it stabi-
lizes money supply, while allowing a monetary28
contraction to put a limit on price increases,
it plans a significant wage restraint, while
strengthening a trend towards further deregula-
tion, liberalization and privatization. Hence,
internal reform can be expected to improve the
economic fundamentals that determine Mexico's
solvency. At the same time, international finan-
cial assistance of $51.8 billion targeted at in-
creasing the maturity and the peso-denomination
of public debt should be sufficient to guarantee
Mexico's liquidity.
This means that economic policy has been
adjusted in a meaningful way and that the short-
run economic development in Mexico now de-
pends on the market reactions, i.e.:
- How long will it take to convince private
agents that the new nominal anchor will be
actually sustained and will provide an effec-
tive constraint for price increases?
- How long will it take for foreign investors to
regain confidence in Mexico's economic pol-
icy and on which level will foreign capital
flows stabilize?
The modifications not only of the reform pro-
gramme but also of the economic targets that
took place in March 1995 indicate that a return
to a stable macroeconomic situation will still
take time. The target for the current account
deficit that could be financed was adjusted from
$14 billion to $2 billion, inflation is projected to
reach 42 instead of 19 per cent, the exchange
rate target had to be increased from 4.5 to 6.0
new pesos per dollar, and a real contraction of
GDP of 2 per cent is expected now, while only a
reduction in real growth to 1.5 per cent was
expected before. While external balance is now
secured by the floating exchange rate, which can
adjust to whatever domestic inflation and exter-
nal capital flows require, regaining the internal
balance seems to be at risk. An inflation rate
that is more than 100 per cent above the target
consistent with the tight monetary policy is
bound either to be reversed soon or to produce
additional real contraction and unemployment.
Obviously, the market tests the credibility of the
new nominal anchor, i.e., a money supply target,
which has now to be sustained to gain credibil-
ity.
2. Alternative Strategies for
Macroeconomic Management
Although it is to early to judge on the effective-
ness of the monetary anchor, the higher than
expected inflation rates in the first quarter of
1995 support arguments that the peso/dollar
exchange rate is a more adequate nominal an-
chor for the Mexican economy: "Market forces
in Mexico are accustomed to using the dollar-
rate as a point of reference. This attitude is very
much based on history, where monetary stability
has been the exception. As such, although the
free float of the peso on the foreign-exchange
market is an indispensable measure in the short
term, it seems premature to implement it as a
permanent policy, hi consequence, there must be
a rapid return to an exchange-rate regime most
appropriate for a small country which is open to
trade" (GFB Informe Econdmico (January
1995)). To judge on this hypothesis it is neces-
sary to know the alternatives. Hence, the follow-
ing discussion will not be in theoretical terms
but will provide examples of a strictly fixed
exchange rate (Argentina) and of rule-based ex-
change rate management (Chile and Israel),
which has been recently implemented, for the
time being, with success.
a. Implementing a Sustainable Fixed
Exchange Rate
With the exception of a monetary union, the
currency board is the most radical way to im-
plement a fixed exchange rate system. Its basic
feature is the full coverage of the monetary base
by foreign exchange, which is guaranteed by a
monetary policy that satisfies each excess sup-
ply and demand for the domestic currency in
exchange for an anchor currency at a given ex-
change rate.
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5 Such a currency board — al-
though in a modified version — has been at the
heart of the Argentine stabilization policy since
April 1991, when the Convertibility Plan came
into force (Schweickert 1994a). hi addition to
the almost complete elimination of an autono-
mous monetary policy by the currency board,
the Convertibility Plan has several components29
that should speed up the convergence of Argen-
tine inflation towards an industrial country level:
- The financing of fiscal deficits by the central
bank is prohibited. This is a necessary condi-
tion for the implementation of the currency
board. A radical privatization process and
fiscal reforms have eliminated the fiscal defi-
cits and have established the credibility of the
currency board.
- The peso has become fully convertible and
fixed to the US dollar, which could have been
used as a legal tender. This includes the use of
dollar-denominated deposits and should
strengthen substitution possibilities between
the two currencies and, hence, the credibility
of the fixed exchange rate.
- A substantial trade liberalization has been
complemented by numerous decrees on
changing regulations to maximize competition
and the pressure on domestic inflation to con-
verge.
Exchange-rate-based stabilization via the
Convertibility Plan was quite successful. Start-
ing with hyperinflation in 1990, annual con-
sumer price inflation came down to 4 per cent at
the end of 1994, implying that the initial real
appreciation to be observed in exchange-rate-
based stabilization programmes had been
stopped and even reverted. This success was
achieved notwithstanding substantial expansion-
ary pressures from capital inflows. Capital
flows have changed their direction, and Argen-
tina has received substantial net inflows since
1992. The nominal peso/dollar exchange rate
has been below the 1:1 parity since April 1991.
This means that there has been an excess supply
of dollars at this parity, which has been ab-
sorbed by the central bank. As implied by the
convertibility law, this has been directly trans-
lated into an increase in money supply, and the
monetary base more than tripled in real terms
from 1990 to 1993. Market-driven expansion led
to real economic growth after years of stagna-
tion or decline.
However, the external balance situation in
1994 signalled that the expansionary first phase
of stabilization had possibly come to an end.
The net inflow of foreign exchange was becom-
ing increasingly dependent on capital inflows
other than foreign direct investment because the
real appreciation steadily increased the trade
deficit. This had two consequences: the expan-
sion of the foreign exchange reserves was un-
likely to be sustainable, and the reserve position
was becoming riskier. Indeed, the net reserves
inflows became flat in 1994, a moderate loss of
foreign exchange and, hence, a reduced mone-
tary expansion had to be expected for 1995. The
speculative wave that hit Argentina after the
failure of exchange-rate-based stabilization in
Mexico led to a sharp deterioration of capital
inflows and losses of foreign exchange. Because
of this external shock, the risks of the stabiliza-
tion concept materialized and the peso-denomi-
nated money supply contracted sharply.
Nevertheless, Argentina sustained the fixed
exchange rate. This was possible because of two
significant differences compared with the Mexi-
can implementation of exchange-rate-based
stabilization.
- The full coverage of the peso monetary base
by foreign exchange allows even for a full
dollarization at the given exchange rate. The
central bank voluntarily exchanges the peso
reserves of the commercial banks into foreign
exchange reserves to reduce the excess de-
mand for US dollars and to limit exchange
risk exposure. Additionally, the parallel
monetary system denominated in US dollars
dampens reserve losses because these aggre-
gates are much more stable than the aggre-
gates denominated in pesos.
- The exchange rate is fixed by law. Authorities
have not changed the rules of the game during
some smaller speculative attacks on the peso
since its fixing in 1991. Additionally, the reli-
ance on price signals rather than negotiations
in Argentina since that time has helped private
agents to understand that there is no alterna-
tive to a quick adjustment.
As a consequence,
2
6 domestic inflation was
further reduced by constant consumer prices in
February and by a monthly deflation of 0.4 per
cent in March which helped the real depreciation
process that had already begun in 1994. Banking
deposits also stabilized in March, and the con-30
traction of the monetary base (determined by
reserve flows) was nearly stopped. It has to be
acknowledged, however, that — similar to
Mexico — this result required additional fiscal
reforms and was supported by some money from
the IMF.
Generally, the Argentine monetary system
provides a blueprint for a sustainable and,
hence, credible fixing of the exchange rate. If the
preference for the US dollar in Mexico is strong
enough to justify the use of the peso/dollar ex-
change rate as a nominal anchor, a renewed
fixing or quasi-fixing of the parity should be
implemented close to the Argentine blueprint.
But the Argentine experience has also demon-
strated the significant risks associated with the
concept even if radically implemented. Ulti-
mately, the risk of speculative or at least of un-
stable capital flows that translate into instabili-




b. Rule-Based Management of a Flexible
Exchange Rate
Rule-based management constitutes a compro-
mise between a currency board and a floating
exchange rate. It is characterized by the defini-
tion of a central parity and the width of a band
which allows the nominal exchange rate to fluc-
tuate around the central parity. There are two
examples for such regimes — Israel and Chile
— which may be telling for Mexico for two
reasons. First, they have been adopted following
failed exchange-rate-based stabilization experi-
ments and a subsequent period of maxi-devalua-
tions. Second, for the time being they have been
successful.
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8 Inflation approached one-digit
levels while internal and external equilibrium
was maintained. During the period 1988-1993,
real GDP grew by 7.2 per cent and 4.4 per cent
in Chile and Israel, respectively. The current
account deficits peaked in 1993 (Chile: 5.1 per
cent, Israel: 2.1 per cent) due to large capital
inflows, but generally remained significantly
below these levels. The two countries adopted
the following exchange rate policies (Helpman et
al. 1994):
The Israeli government adopted an exchange
rate band in January 1989. The band consisted
of a fixed new Israeli shekel/basket central par-
ity with a 3 per cent fluctuation zone around this
parity. The band's width was enlarged to 5 per
cent in March 1990. hi December 1991, after an
upward adjustment of the central parity, the
authorities relaxed the fixity of the central parity
and announced an upward crawl of the exchange
rate band, hi addition, an official inflation target
was announced for the first time. The rate of
crawl of the central parity was set at 9 per cent
per year, to reflect the difference between Is-
rael's inflation target and a forecast of foreign
inflation for 1992. The announced rate of crawl
for the central parity was reduced to an annual
rate of 8 per cent per year starting from Novem-
ber 1992 and to 6 per cent per year starting from
July 1993, and the announced inflation targets
for 1993 and 1994 were 10 and 8 per cent re-
spectively.
The Chilean authorities adopted a policy of
daily adjustments in the peso/dollar reference
exchange rate in 1985. At the start of each
month, the authorities announce the size of the
daily exchange rate adjustments for that month,
based on the difference between domestic infla-
tion in the previous month and a forecast of
foreign inflation. The width of the band was 2
per cent around the central parity in the initial
phase, increased to 3 per cent in January 1988,
and further widened to 5 per cent in June 1989.
hi January 1992, there was a discrete revalua-
tion of 5 per cent in the central parity, and the
band's width was increased to 10 per cent
around the reference rate. Since July 1992, the
band policy has been defined in terms of a
basket of foreign currencies and not in relation
to the US dollar, as in the earlier periods.
Both countries — contrary to Mexico — in-
creased the flexibility of their exchange rate
regimes over time by moving to a passive
crawling peg as central parity and by increasing
the width of the exchange bands. This shows a
clear preference for maintaining external equilib-
rium. If the actual exchange rate remains at the
central parity, this implies a constant real ex-
change rate. Hence, the exchange rate system is31
neutral with respect to the real exchange rate. If
the actual exchange rate moves to the upper
(lower) limit, the real exchange rate depreciates
(appreciates). Hence, the exchange rate system
allows real exchange rate adjustment.
While the two countries have shared common
features of the exchange rate policy, the impli-
cations for monetary policy are different to some
extent. Since in Israel the passive crawl is ad-
justed only annually and calculated on the basis
of an inflation target, the autonomy of monetary
policy is restricted to deliver this target. Like-
wise, since in Chile the passive crawl is adjusted
each month and calculated on the basis of past
inflation, monetary policy has a significant dis-
cretionary power. This power is further
strengthened by Chile's treatment of capital
flows. While long-term-oriented foreign direct
investment is encouraged by extremely liberal
regulations, short-term external borrowing is
discriminated by a 30 per cent tax on loans with
maturity of less than one year.
From the Mexican perspective it is worth to
note that a passive crawl with a band may guide
exchange rate expectations but gives up the ex-
change rate as a nominal anchor. The outcome
for domestic inflation depends on the monetary
policy. The credibility of monetary policy, i.e.,
of the central bank, has to be higher in the Israeli
case because the inflation target has to be
achieved.
The revision of the inflation target in Mexico
demonstrates that it is still a long way to go for
the Mexican central bank to establish the credi-
bility of its monetary targets. Hence, using the
Chilean model could be characterized as being a
low-risk strategy for returning to exchange rate
management in Mexico that gives priority to the
maintenance of external equilibrium in order to
stabilize trade and investment perspectives.
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But even this low-risk strategy would need to
strengthen the relation between the money sup-
ply and domestic prices via further liberalization
and a strong commitment to pre-announced
monetary targets. Establishing a nominal anchor
for the Mexican economy in this way could be
used to bring inflation down gradually to the US
level, hi a medium-term perspective, if the
credibility of monetary policy is fully estab-
lished, the exchange rate system could be modi-
fied to approach the Israel model including an
explicit inflation target. Such a strategy appears
to be the most adequate one to provide the "soft
landing", which is so difficult to achieve by ex-
change-rate-based stabilization.
3. Policy Recommendations
The failure of exchange-rate-based stabilization
in Mexico exemplifies the systematic risks of the
concept:
- Stabilization is achieved by risking strong
impediments to exports and adjustment pres-
sure to import-competing industries;
- monetary stability strongly depends to a large
extent on the stability of trade and capital
flows, i.e., on external factors that are exoge-
nous for the host country;
- even if external shocks are ruled out, the
smooth functioning of an exchange rate an-
chor requires a more or less perfect function-
ing of market mechanisms, i.e., flexible prices
and quick supply response;
- the adequate reform effort is unknown ex ante
and also difficult to manage because of a con-
strained reform capacity or a reduced willing-
ness to reform when capital inflows allow to
expand absorption.
Generally, capital inflows provide a breathing
space for domestic policy to be successful on the
reform front. The Mexican case demonstrates,
however, that even 5 years time and far-reaching
reforms have been insufficient to provide a "soft
landing". It seems, therefore, advisable to substi-
tute the high risk by a low-risk strategy for
macroeconomic management if floating ex-
change rates are politically not acceptable. Rule-
based exchange rate management is such a low-
risk strategy. It implies
- to continue stabilizing the exchange rate via a
restrictive monetary policy;
- to start limiting exchange rate flexibility with
a passive crawl as central parity and wide
bands;32
- to limit exchange rate flexibility further to the
extent that monetary policy becomes credible
and efficient goods and factor markets are es-
tablished;
- to improve these preconditions by giving fis-
cal priority to taxing consumption and to
spending on infrastructure and human capital
development, by strengthening the financial
system, especially for the banking system, to
make it a sound system for collecting and ef-
ficiently distributing loanable funds, by
strengthening the official labour market via
reducing nonwage labour costs and impedi-
ments to mobility, and by diversifying and
expanding exports as well as attracting FDI
(see Section II.c).
The present involuntary floating of the peso
gives monetary authorities a chance to improve
policies in these respects without unnecessarily
tying their hands with an overly restrictive ex-
change rate regime, hi addition to the fact that
there is no alternative to this policy in the short
run, it may also provide a test whether the
Mexican economy actually needs a nominal
anchor in the form of a fixed or quasi-fixed ex-
change rate.
IV. Perspectives and Policy Recommendations
Short-run economic turbulences cannot obscure
the perception that Mexico's attractiveness as a
host for both domestic and foreign investment is
very likely to benefit from two positive devel-
opments that were initiated before the crisis
broke out: First, economically, Mexico's real
capital stock has undergone substantial mod-
ernization during the last few years and can be
expected to materialize in much higher produc-
tivity increases than before. Second, institu-
tionally, unilateral reforms of the trading regime,
the implementation of NAFTA and the multilat-
eral trade liberalization in the GATT/WTO
framework will not only contribute to open the
Mexican market further, but will also increase
the degree of stability and predictability in
Mexican policy making. Membership in the
OECD is conducive to more stability, too.
To make these developments fully effective,
however, requires a number of steps to be taken.
They are necessary in the sense that without
them the two developments — even if pursued
further—cannot bear fruits:
First, it is of utmost importance to restore
both a noninflationary environment and stability
of the real exchange rate. Bearing in mind, that
in principle, Mexico prefers exchange-rate-based
monetary polices, the study proposes a more
flexible policy than the quasi-fixing until
December 1994 to be introduced after the transi-
tory period of floating. Yet, even this more
flexible scheme requires substantial discipline
and consistency in wage policies, fiscal policies
and monetary policies. If successful, such pack-
age will trigger higher domestic savings and
more efficient allocation of funds. Nevertheless,
choosing a nominal external anchor through ex-
change rate targeting will remain an approach
that is exposed to risks beyond the responsibility
and influence of the Mexican authorities.
Second, bottleneck factors such as in human
capital formation and infrastructure must be
removed provided that the net profitability of
related projects can be assessed a priori with
sufficient probability.
Third, regional diversification of domestic
activities can be achieved through abandoning
all measures that discriminate against the agri-
cultural sector. This would not only help to meet
the crucially important targets of more equity
and alleviation of poverty. It would also support
stimulating factors coming from the interna-
tional arena in terms of higher world market
prices for many agricultural products after the
implementation of the Uruguay round.
Fourth, Mexico should launch initiatives to
link themselves more to non-NAFTA sourcing
and export markets — in particular, to the Asian
part of APEC and to Europe, but less so to33
Latin America, as these markets are less absorp-
tive. The relatively low attractiveness of Mexico
for Japanese investors, for instance, is a disturb-
ing phenomenon if it is viewed in the light of the
ubiquitous nature of Japanese foreign invest-
ment.
hi spite of its richness in oil resources, Mex-
ico is one of the few countries that can be ex-
pected to overcome the Latin American syn-
drome of commodity-based development, social
segmentation and monetary volatility. There is a
middle class strongly interested in monetary
stability and economic growth and prepared to
contribute net savings to the financial sector.
Finally, it is increasingly understood in Mexico
that abundance in fossil energy has more often
been a source of temporary windfalls than the
base for a sustainable catching-up process.
Appendix: Stylized Facts about Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization
To see how a fixed exchange rate can stabilize
an economy,
3
0 we assume that the economy is in
macroeconomic equilibrium and net capital
flows are zero. The difference between domestic
and foreign inflation is compensated for by
nominal devaluation, so that the real exchange
rate is constant, i.e., the real exchange rate is in
equilibrium but inflation is significantly higher
than abroad. If the exchange rate is fixed in such
a situation, inflation decreases immediately be-
cause the price increases for traded goods are
curbed by world market conditions. But ongoing
inflation for nontraded goods will lead to an
immediate real appreciation.
Real appreciation creates an excess demand
for traded goods and an excess supply of non-
traded goods. This is because traded goods be-
come relatively cheaper and demand shifts from
nontraded to traded goods. Excess demand for
traded goods implies a trade deficit, an outflow
of foreign reserves, and — with a passive mone-
tary policy — a monetary contraction.
3
1 As a
consequence, absorption decreases, the demand
for traded goods declines and the trade imbal-
ance is reduced. But the decrease in absorption
further increases the excess supply of nontraded
goods. This exerts a pressure to reduce the
prices of nontraded goods. Domestic inflation
must be even lower than abroad in order to re-
move the real overvaluation and the excess sup-




A necessary precondition for private agents to
adjust prices is that they expect the monetary
contraction to occur. If this is not the case,
ongoing inflation, growing real overvaluation,
and increasing internal and external imbalances
will end the stabilization programme soon.
Therefore, the credibility of the monetary con-
traction becomes a basic precondition for the




with its credibility result from three macro-
economic constraints: the government budget,
the foreign exchange reserves and the unem-
ployment.
The need to finance the government budget
may constrain the possibility of a monetary con-
traction in low-income countries because collect-
ing the inflation tax and borrowing on narrow
domestic capital markets play a significant role
in financing government expenditure. Therefore,
an exchange-rate-based stabilization needs fiscal
discipline, i.e., expenditure has to be reduced
and/or alternative taxes have to be raised. Oth-
erwise growing pressure on the central bank to
increase the money supply would be expected by
rational private agents. Hence, prices would not
be adjusted.
The outflow of foreign exchange reserves
could run down the stock of reserves before
trade is balanced, hi this case, a nominal de-
valuation will be expected, and this expectation
will lead to a devaluation even before the re-
serves are actually depleted.
3
4 Such a devalua-
tion is typically avoided in the short run by in-
creasing protectionism to stop reserve losses34
(Williamson 1987). Both reactions diminish the
pressure on private agents to adjust prices.
If the monetary contraction is possible, the
question arises, if it actually occurs. The tempo-
rary fall in demand provides strong incentives
for the authorities to change the programme and
to avoid temporary unemployment via a mone-
tary expansion. This means that the announce-
ment of a fixed exchange rate is time-inconsis-
tent and private agents have an incentive not to
adjust prices but to wait for the policy switch.
hi the case that private agents judge macro-
economic constraints not to be relevant, mone-
tary contraction is credible and guarantees a
pressure to reduce the prices of nontraded goods.
Whether these prices are actually adjusted de-
pends on the price setting behaviour in the real
sphere of the economy. The fall of nontraded
goods prices will not occur in the presence of
indexation and inflationary inertia (Edwards
1993: 5-10) and a low level of competition, hi
this case, the monetary contraction will lead to
higher unemployment rather than to a real ex-
change rate adjustment
The adjustment towards a new equilibrium
becomes easier if the country is able to attract
capital inflows. There are basically three reasons
for an increase in capital inflows:
(1) Commercial banks and official lenders
honouring the macroeconomic reform efforts
may grant access to new credit lines and in-
crease foreign direct investment. Such capital
inflows are of a permanent nature as long as the
reform is sustained.
(2) Private agents shift their portfolio towards
domestic assets if they expect an undistorted
macroeconomic environment and a higher prof-
itability of investment in the country undergoing
a stabilization programme. This capital inflow
contains not only permanent but also temporary
components such as repatriated capital flight.
(3) Private agents shift their portfolio further
towards domestic assets because speculative
windfall gains can be earned in the short run due
to high nominal interest rates and a guaranteed
exchange rate. This type of capital inflow is of
temporary nature.
Large capital inflows finance emerging trade
deficits and increase foreign exchange reserves.
Hence, the money supply grows and the prices
for nontraded goods do not have to be adjusted
downwards, i.e., domestic inflation has not to be
lower than inflation in the anchor currency.
However, such an equilibrium may not be sus-
tainable. First, capital inflows may decrease
because they are of a temporary nature at least
to some extent. Second, the country may experi-
ence a negative terms-of-trade shock. Third, if
the exchange rate is fixed against a single cur-
rency, e.g., the US dollar, an appreciation of the
US dollar against other relevant currencies
implies decreasing world market prices.
All these shocks have qualitatively the same
implication for the economy. The real exchange
rate becomes overvalued, the trade deficit has to
be financed by an outflow of foreign exchange
reserves, and the demand for nontraded goods
falls short of supply. This means that all the
problems described above for the case of stabili-
zation without capital inflows emerge. More-
over, the problems are even more pronounced
because of the initial expansion. This is why the
reversal of capital flows typically marks the end
of fixed exchange rate regimes. Monetary con-
traction is not sustained and a devaluation crisis
emerges: the "stabilization blues" (Guidotti and
Ve"gh 1992).35
Endnotes
1 A comparison of Mexican and US trade figures suggests that exports from maquiladora industries account for 60-70
per cent of US imports from Mexico, and, hence, up to 50 per cent of Mexico's merchandise exports to all destinations
(GATT 1993: 3).
L See Section II. 1 .c in which the effects of agricultural liberalization are discussed for Mexico.
3 A second-best approach: not to impose antidumping margins but to accept price undertakings as the EU does against
the CEECs.
4 Assumptions on the change in oil prices are essential for Mexico's income position. In the model, oil prices are linked
to the price of OECD manufacturing exports. It is assumed that OPEC countries aim at maintaining a stable relation-
ship between the price of their manufactured imports from the OECD area and the price of their oil exports. Hence, a
fall in the price of OECD manufactured exports due to liberalization and increased competition induces a fall in oil
prices.
3 According to regular surveys of the International Finance Corporation (Pfeffermann and Madarassy 1991; Glen and
Sumlinski 1995) Malaysia had an investment ratio of 27 per cent, Thailand 24 per cent and Indonesia 22 per cent.
6 IMF International Financial Statistics (March 1995).
' Early enough, fears were nourished by empirical estimates supporting the view that in fact external factors, in particu-
lar in the United States, played an important role in encouraging short-term capital to leave the United States and to
enter Mexico. Among such factors, the decline in US interest rates, continuing recession and capital account develop-
ments in the United States figured prominently (Calvo et al. 1992).
8 IMF International Financial Statistics (March 1995).
These three countries are the leading investors in Mexico together with the United Kingdom. FDI statistics for the
United Kingdom are not available after 1991. In this year, Mexico held a share in UK total FDI (at book value) of only
0.3 per cent in all industries and 0.4 per cent in manufacturing. These shares were the same as in 1987 (UK, CSO
1993).
*" A breakdown of Japanese investment by industries is only available for host countries with a relatively large amount of
Japanese FDI. Mexico does not belong to this group.
Bundesbank data on the stock of foreign investment in Germany in 1992, for instance, record an amount of only DM 8
million of investment from Mexico, compared with DM 310 million from Argentina and DM 125 million from Brazil.
1
2 Helpman et al. (1994), EIU Country Profile Mexico (various issues).
1
3 On 1 January 1993, the peso was trimmed by three zeros, one peso being worth 1,000 of the old pesos.
1 Israel's and Chile's exchange rate policies are discussed in Section III.2.b as possible blueprints for the future Mexican
exchange rate regime.
^ These arguments between the government, employees and trade unions include targets for prices and wages. For an
overview, see, e.g., Dornbusch and Werner (1994). For the comprehensiveness of reforms in Mexico, see Aspe (1993)
and Cline (1991).
1° See Appendix for the theoretical concept.
1 On the Mexican "tradition" to produce periods of real appreciation followed by devaluations of the currency, see
Furstenberg and Teolis (1993b).
* Whether it was overvalued even before foreign exchange reserves started to decline, as argued by Dombusch and
Werner (1994) and Fischer and Schnatz (1995), is as difficult to answer as to determine the equilibrium real exchange
rate.
1" It could, of course, be argued that sterilizing capital inflows would have increased the size of inflows further making
sterilization noneffective (Brand and Rohm 1995). However, such a policy would have improved the coverage of the
monetary base by foreign exchange.
It has, of course, to be acknowledged that there has been a lot of improvement in this area since the 1980s. For an
overview, see, e.g., EIU Country Profile Mexico (1994/95).
2
1 For an overview over reform measures, see G.O. Martinez (1994), Aspe (1994), and Welch (1993). The new regula-
tory framework for the central bank is discussed in F.B. Martinez (1995).
2
2 World Bank (unpublished material), EIU Country Report Mexico (various issues), OECD (1992).
2
3 While these measures tended to increase external competition (Ize 1990), domestic competition was increased by a
general deregulation of the economy. For an overview, see Martinez and Farber (1994).
24 Gpg Informe Econdmico (various issues), IMF IMF Survey (6 February 1995).
2^ On currency boards and the different forms of implementation, see Hanke and Schuler (1993,1994).
2
6 Recent information is derived from FM (1995) and IMF IMF Survey (17 April 1995).36
2' For the benefits of such a North American Monetary Union (NAMU) from the Mexican perspective, see Fiirstenberg
and Teolis (1993a). For a discussion of monetary unification from the perspective of low income countries in the
European case, see Schweickert (1995b).
2** For the data, see EIU (1995a, 1995b) and IMF International Financial Statistics (various issues).
2" For a more theoretical discussion of the passive crawling-peg as an exchange rate strategy for developing countries, see
Schweickert (1993: Chapter D).
3" For a more detailed discussion of the theoretical implications including a graphical presentation, see Schweickert
(1993: Chapter C; 1994b).
3
1 In the following, monetary contraction means a decreasing real money supply. Correspondingly, decreasing domestic
prices mean a lower difference between inflation at home and abroad.
3
2 In the absence of real shocks, the equilibrium of the real exchange rate remains constant and the actual real exchange
rate has to return to its initial level.
Contrary to a stabilization programme with flexible exchange rates, the extent of the monetary contraction is unknown
at the beginning of the programme. This makes the credibility of the monetary contraction a challenging precondition
in a fixed exchange rate regime. On the advantages of stabilization with flexible exchange rates, see Schweickert
(1993).
•** See the literature on balance-of-payments crises summarized by Aghevli and Montiel (1991).37
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